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Since 1996, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has waged a campaign of terror in Uganda and 
neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has resulted in a number of 
fatalities and continues to threaten the security of the region. From its inception, the objective 
of the ADF has been to overthrow the Ugandan government and establish an Islamic state 
governed by a Salafi interpretation of Islam. This study seeks to document the history of the 
ADF and to locate its position within contemporary Salafi debates. It does so by answering 
the following questions: (1) what do we know about the ADF? (2) How did the ADF emerge 
in Uganda? (3) Is the ADF Jihadi-Salafi movement or local political movement in disguise? 
This study utilises interviews, as well as archival and ethnographic approaches to research. 
Findings suggest that the ADF is a Jihadi-Salafi militant movement, which was originally 
established under the name Salafi Jihad Council (SaJiCo). However, the initial failure to 
stand alone and the Busitema defeat forced them to join other non-Muslim rebel groups to 
form the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). In addition, this study confirmed that, persuasive 
rhetoric of ADF leader, Jamilu Mukulu in addition to a long history of economic, social and 
political marginalisation of Muslims in Uganda by colonial and post-colonial governments, 
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Ahl al-Hadith The people of Hadith or Ahl al-Athari meaning people who 
follow the sayings and actions of the Prophet and his righteous 
companions.  
Al-Salaf al-Salih  ‘Pious predecessors’ of the Prophet Muhammad.  
Amir    Denotes a ruler, a leader, or any one in authority. 
Aqida  Doctrinal creed, referring to the essential and core components 
of the Islamic belief system. 
Bid’a Heretical or deviant innovation, Ahl al-bida'e is used in 
reference to innovators.  
Buganda  A sub-nation and the largest kingdom in Uganda. 
Bunyoro  This is a kingdom and the second largest in Uganda. 
Da’wah  Missionary work for inviting others to Islam.  
Jahali  Literally means ‘ignorant’; jahiliya denotes ‘ignorance’  
Kabaka  The title given to the King of Buganda. 
Katikkiro  The title given to the prime minister of Buganda. 
Madrasa  Usually used in reference to an Islamic school for children.   
Manhaj  The methodology employed to achieve an idea. 
Mawlid Festivals that mark the birthday anniversary of Prophet 
Muhammad.  
Omukama  The tittle given to the king and leader of Bunyoro.     
Ridda  Apostasy; a murtadd is an apostate.  
Sahawa, Awakening, it refers to revivalist movements in the Middle 
East.  
Shirik Denying the oneness of God or engaging in polytheism. A 
mushrik is a polytheist.   
Takifir  Excommunication of other Muslims.  
Taqlid Blind imitation, especially in following religious scholar’s 
opinions.  
Tawhid The doctrine of the oneness of God, the core component of 





Figure 1: Political Boundary Map of Uganda. 
Table 1: Illustrates the appeals to pathos found in the Muslim Massacre in Mbarara (MMM) 
audio. 
Table 2: Illustrates appeals to ethos found in Muslim Massacre in Mbarara (MMM) audio. 
Table 3: Illustrates the executive committee for Salaf Jihad Council in 1994. 
Table 4: Illustrates the national executive committee for Salaf Foundation in 1994 
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Fig. 1: Political Boundary Map of Uganda. 
 
Source: “Uganda Maps,” Perry-Castaneda Library, University of Texas Library Online, 






The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) is one of the oldest but least-known militant groups in 
Uganda. Currently operating along the eastern borders of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), the ADF has carried out numerous acts of terrorism in both Uganda and DRC. 
Besides their stated goal to purify Islam from innovations (bid'a), the ADF aspires for a new 
Uganda, governed by Islamic laws. Established officially in 1996, the ADF has unfortunately 
received little attention in spite of its long history and the high count of atrocities committed. 
This thesis is therefore, an attempt to document and interpret the rise of this Muslim militant 
movement and its recent developments using both interviews and archival research. This 
thesis also explores audiotapes recorded by ADF leadership that persuaded many young 
Muslims to join the movement. 
 
The thesis is organised into five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which contains 
information about the thesis in general, particularly its structure and a summary of the 
individual chapters. It also covers the theoretical framework that aided in the inception of this 
thesis, as well as the research gap it aims to fill. It concludes with three research questions 
raised because of the theoretical background and the identified gap.  
 
Chapter two covers the review of the literature. It commences with a discussion of the term 
‘Salafism’ and the debate surrounding it. It explores the origin of the term, the similarities 
and differences as well as the major three categories in the ‘Salafi’ political discourse; the 
purists, politicos and jihadists. The chapter further engages with the theoretical framework. In 
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this way, two methodologically related theories are discussed, namely; Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) and Persuasion/rhetoric theory. CDA is used to read through the audio 
messages of ADF leadership, while persuasion/rhetoric is used to identify persuasive tactics 
used by the ADF to recruit fighters.  
 
Chapter three discusses the methodology used, including a section on materials and 
procedure. Chapter four covers information on the ADF with a brief survey of the history of 
Islam in Uganda. Finally, chapter five is the concluding section of the thesis, which includes 
conclusive remarks, personal thoughts and recommendations.  
  
1.2 Theoretical Background 
The news of the ADF became public in 1996 (Pehle &Speyer 2015, 2). Previously, the group 
was carrying out clandestine military activities under the earlier denomination of the Salafi 
Foundation (New Vision, 1995). In the early 1990s, many Salafi youths who later joined this 
movement had already experienced several violent confrontations with other non-Salafi 
Muslims and the Police. These events resulted in serious causalities on both sides, leading to 
arrest of more than 400 Salafi youths, including their leader, Jamilu Mukulu (Abbey 1991; 
Titeca & Fahey 2016, 1192). Upon their release in 1994, most of them fled to the forests in 
Western Uganda and declared a war against the Ugandan government, interpreting the 
government’s interventions and imprisonment as “state interference in Muslim affairs” 
(Titeca and Vlasenroot 2012, 158). 
 
The ADF advocates for a strict interpretation of Islam and constantly challenges the 
traditional Islamic scholars. Additionally, the ADF calls for the establishment of an Islamic 
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state which is similar to other Jihadi-Salafi movements such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab in 
Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, or the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. Salafists, as 
observed by Meijer (2009, 1) believe in purity of religion. They advocate for strict adherence 
to the texts of the Qur’an and Hadiths. They claim to be the followers of the first generation 
of Muslims (the “pious forefathers”, al-Salaf al-Salih) and regard their methodology 
(manhaj) as the only correct pathway for a ‘true’ Muslim (Meijer 2009, 4). Since 1996, the 
group has persistently continued its activities, which involve killings, abduction of civilians 
and continuous clashes with Ugandan armed forces. 
 
Despite the long period of the ADF’s existence and its violent activities, little is known about 
the group, especially in the academic circles. This lack of sources on the ADF was my first 
inspiration for the inception of this research. Although, their existence pre-dates Nigeria’s 
Boko Haram and Somalia’s Al-Shabab, the ADF, has remained largely, if not entirely 
unstudied by the international academic community. 
 
1.3 Research Gaps 
In contrast to other Muslim militant groups that aspire towards the establishment of ‘Islamic 
states’, studies on the ADF are still minimal. This is very striking, as the ADF has been active 
since early 1990s, being possibly one of the first examples of Islamist militant movements in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The ADF pre-dates Somalia’s Al-Shabab (active since 2006) and 
Nigeria’s Boko Haram (active since late 2000s), both of which have received ample attention 
in the international media as well as in academic scholarship. 
 
Furthermore, in the academic field of religious studies, and particularly, in the field of Islamic 
studies, the existing literature on the topic of Salafism in Africa includes very little mention 
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of Uganda. It is upon this background that an academic study on the rise of this militant 
Islamic movement in Uganda is needed. This study will add to the scanty literature on this 
movement which has been largely ignored by the academicians and the international 
community. As ADF members claim to be followers of the Salafi School, this dissertation 
will also attempt to clarify the ideology of the movement and locate it within the spectrum of 
contemporary Islamic revivalist movements. 
 
1.4 General Objective and Questions 
This study forms an attempt to document the history of a case study of Muslim militant 
movement in Uganda, the ADF. This will be done by answering the following questions 
1. What do we know about the ADF? 
2. How did the ADF emerge in Uganda? 
3. Is the ADF a Jihadi-Salafi religious movement or a local political movement in 
disguise? 
 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted in Uganda, the prime target of the ADF. 
Ugandans continue to be the primary recruits of the movement, and most of the defectors 
from the movement reside in the country. Former fighters of the ADF were the respondents in 
semi-structured interviews for this study. Besides interviews, archival research in the 
Kampala City Council Authority (KCCA) Library as well as the Makerere University Main 
Library was conducted. Both libraries are located in Kampala, the capital city of Uganda. 
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1.6 Some of the Sources that Frame this Study 
To answer the three questions that guide this study, the researcher used both primary and 
secondary sources. The newspapers examined were The New Vision (est. 1986) and the Daily 
Monitor (est. 1995). Both papers have been in existence since the initial stages of the 
movement. The New Vision is the official newspaper controlled by the Ugandan government 
and has the largest circulation in the country. It has been in existence since 1986. The paper 
reported the events related to the rise of the ADF before its inception in early 1990s. The 
publication has access to classified information from state security agents, as such, many 
engagements between the ADF and government troops especially in western Uganda and in 
the Rwenzori Mountains, were recorded by the paper. However, since this is a government-
owned newspaper, the privately owned Daily Monitor, was used as a way of corroborating 
information. The Daily Monitor besides being an additional source of information is also 
critical of the Ugandan government.  
 
In terms of secondary sources, there are some articles that have been published on the ADF, 
especially in the field of security studies. Although none of these are particularly insightful 
from the point of view of interpretation and theory, but some of them do provide useful 
information. For instance, Kristof Titeca and Koen Vlassenroot (2012), as well as Kristof 
Titeca and Fahey Daniel (2016), give a background overview of the movement’s history. 
Christopher R. Day (2011) gives an account on the movement in his article “The Fates of 
Rebels: Insurgencies in Uganda”. David H. Shinn (2007) also has a portion on the movement 
in his article “Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn”. Finally, Abdi Chande (2000)’s article 
“Radicalisation in East Africa” completes the meagre spectrum of available secondary 




Moreover, to better understand the context of the contemporary Salafi narrative, including its 
history, doctrine, and the organisation, this study used a variety of sources. Specifically, 
Shiraz Maher’s (2016) book on Salafi-Jihadism, as well as the works of Quintun 
Wickotrowicz (2006), Andrea Brigaglia (2015), and Thomas Hegghammer (2009), were used 
in discussing the differences between Salafi and non-Salafi Islamic militant groups. Henri 
Lauzière (2008) provided the historical background for the emergence of Salafism as an 
intellectual and religious movement and the different connotations of this term in Islamic 
discourse. Other sources include Roel Meijer (ed.2009) on global Salafism, Terje Ostebo 
(2008) on African Salafism and Alex Thurston (2015) on Salafism in Nigeria. 
 
1.7 Thesis Overview 
This master’s mini-dissertation is organised into five chapters. Following this introductory 
chapter, the second chapter consists of a literature review in which Salafism is analysed in 
detail. Chapter three discuss the methodology used for data collection, the results from this 
collection and analysis of the material. Chapter four covers the ADF movement in detail. 
Finally, chapter five provides a detailed discussion of the study and offers some conclusions 




2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with a discussion of Salafism in detail, including the academic debates 
surrounding the movement. The definition of the term, its origin, as well as differences and 
similarities within the trend and its major categories are explored. The chapter further 
discusses the theoretical framework that guides this study beginning with Critical Discourse 
Analysis theory (CDA) and concluding with Persuasion and rhetorical theory. 
 
2.2 Salafism 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the ADF, the centrepiece of this study, claims to be 
part of the Salafi trend. Between 1994 and 1995, they performed their activities under the 
guise of the Salafi Foundation. However, before getting into details of the ADF movement, it 
is important to discuss the Salafi trend in general. It is important to note that discussing 
Salafism completely and exhaustively in a single chapter hardly does justice to this 
phenomenon. As such, this study only provides a glimpse of this broad, complex subject.  
 
As far as literature on the Salafi debate is concerned, there has been ample studies on 
Salafism since the September 11, 2001 attacks. Prior to this incident, academic studies 
focused primarily on the term ‘fundamentalism’, especially after the 1981 assassination of 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat allegedly committed by followers of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood (Meijer 2009, 1). Olivier Roy (2002) attempted to discuss Salafism on a global 
scale but he also analysed it as a neo-fundamentalist movement, lumping it together with 
other movements such as Hizb al-Tahrir (ibid). 
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2.1.1 Understanding Salafism 
Linguistically, the term Salaf in Arabic literally refers to “that which precedes” (Lisan al-
Arab in Wright 2012, 8). However, in a religious context, the term is used in reference to the 
first three generations after Prophet Muhammad (Ali 2015, 1). These three generations 
maintain a high status among Muslims since they had first-hand information from the Prophet 
and his companions. The three generations that came after Muhammad include; his 




Salafis often extend the literal meaning of the term to be one of the core principles of their 
religious belief. Some Salafi writers such as Nasir al Din al-Albani argues that the first three 
generations of Muslims represent the pure form of Islam before the Muslim community was 
exposed to philosophical ideas and philosophers ideologically divided Muslims (Wright 
2012, 8). Moreover, Nasir argues further that, they had their own system based on the strict 
following of Quran and Prophet Muhammad’s traditions (sunna). This practice to the the 
Salafis- represents the only ‘correct’ version of Islam which should be followed by all 
Muslims (ibid). 
 
Similarly, Qadhi (2014, 2) observes that, within the modern context, the term Salafi has come 
to designate an Islamic methodology (manhaj) that aspires towards the emulation of Prophet 
Muhammad through the practices and beliefs of the first three generations. This is because, 
they were the closest to the period of Muhammad and the era of revelation, that best 
embodies the Prophetic tradition or sunna (Qadhi 2014, 2). 
                                                          
1
This is from the hadith that says: “The best amongst the people, are those living in my century (generation), 
and then those coming after them, and then those coming after the latter” (Bukhar 57, 2). The term Salafi is 
also used in the Quran with similar linguistic meaning. It says “and we made them a people of the past 
(salafan) and an example to later ages (Quran: 43:56). 
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Similar to Sufis who openly acknowledge that Sufism was unknown to the first Muslims and 
it was later chosen as a reference to an old type of Islamic piety, Salafis also concede that 
Salafism was not known among early Muslims (Lauzière 2008, 67). Additionally, throughout 
the history of Islamic literature, there is no clear definition or even presence of the term 
Salafism in the original sources of Islam. In fact, no verse from the Quran that mentions the 
word besides ‘salafan’
2
, which refers to its linguistic interpretation. 
 
In their defence, Salafis frequently refer to one hadith that mentions the term Salaf. It is found 
in the book of Sahih Bukhari (Vol. 8, hadith no. 58885) and in the book of Sahih Muslim 
(Vol. 34, hadith no. 6004). This ‘authentic’ hadith claims that the Prophet called himself 
Salafi while speaking to his daughter Fatimah; “So be afraid of Allah and be patient, for I’m 
your first Salaf (predecessor).”
3
 However, both the hadith and the Quranic references do not 
identify a specific group within a community as ‘Salafis’. As argued by Lauzière (2008) and 
others, if Salafism existed in the early stages of Islamic history, it would have required more 
time to develop since “…information had to be sifted, Hadiths and reports had to be assessed 
and ultimately subjective choices had to be made” (Lauzière 2008, 36). Nevertheless, many 
Muslim groups, not only those that were opposed to Sufism and the idea of Ilmu al-Kalam 
(‘science of discourse’) 
4
 schools have used the term. Imam Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (d. 1111 
                                                          
2
 The Quran states: “We made them a precedent (salafan) and an example for the later people” (Q43:56).  
3
The hadith is narrated by Aisha, a wife of the Prophet, in her conversation with Fatimah, a daughter of the 
Prophet. Aisha asked Fatimah why she wept and then laughed later. Fatimah responded that it was a secret 
conversation with her father (i.e. the Prophet) who told her: “Gabriel had a habit of revising the Quran once a 
year with me, but now had done it twice. This made him aware that soon he will die, so he told me; fa’tiqi llaha 
wa-sibiri, fai’nni nie’ma salafu laki” (so fear Allah and be patient, you will be my first Salaf (predecessor) and I 
wept” (Bukhari, Vol. 8, No. 58885 and Muslim vol. 31, No. 6004). 
4
Ilm ul-Kalam literary means ‘science of discourse’ or Islamic scholastic theology, which was established in an 
attempt to understand faith and religion by logical reasoning instead of relying only on the revealed text. See: 
Wolfson, A. Hurry. 1976. The Philosophy of the Kalam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
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CE) for example frequently makes strong references to the term Salaf in his famous book 
written in twelfth century Ihya Ulum al Din (Revival of Religious Sciences). 
 
2.1.2 Origin of Salafism 
Historically, some scholars (such as Frank Griffel [2015]) attribute Salafism and Salafiyya to 
Muslim reformists of the nineteenth century; Jamal al-Din al-Afghan (d. 1897 CE), 
Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) and Rashid Rida (d. 1935).
5
 This is rooted in the work of the 
French scholar of Islam and Sufism, Louis Massignon
6
 (Lauzière 2016, 92). His work has 
been repeatedly invoked and become scholarly dogma in explaining the origin of Salafism 
(Lauzière 2010, 374). Lauzière argues that the Arabic word Salafiyya was never used as an 
abstract noun meaning ‘Salafism’ prior to the 1920s. He asserts further that it was only used 
by Muhammad Abduh late in his life and had positive connotations. It was not used as a noun 
or a label as argued by Griffel (2015, 202). Instead, Salafiyya was used as a reference to 
Sunni theological groups that differed from the Ash’aris (Lauzière 2016, 90). In other words, 
they never called themselves Salafis in the same way the term has been used since 
approximately the 1960s.  
 
On this note, Meijer (2009) argues that Salafi trend is reflected in the teachings of Imam 
Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855), Taqi al-Dini ibn Taymiyyah (d.1328) and later adopted by 
                                                          
5
See for example: Hourani, Albert. 1983. 3
rd
 ed. Arabic thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. Fakhry, Majid. 1983. 2
nd
 Ed. A History of Islamic Philosophy. New York: Colombia University 
Press, and Brown L. Carl. 2000. Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Philosophy. New York: Colombia 
University Press. Pp. 140-141. For another perspective, see for example: Weismann, Itzchak. 2001. Tate of 
Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus. Leiden: Brill. 
6
Louis Massignon’s work on Salafiyya first appeared in a French journal of which he was the director; Revue du 
Monde Musulman Vol. 36 in 1919. From that stage, the claim continued to reappear in many other works 
including those of the British Orientalist, Sir Hamilton Gibb. 1947. Modern Trends in Islam. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press.   
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Muhamad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d.1791) who allied with the Saudi family to form the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1744 (Meijer 2009, 4; Mardini 2013, 20). Ibn Hanbal is said to 
have lived in a period when Islamic ideas had become diverse. Groups like Mu’tazilites were 
calling for a rational interpretation of the Islamic texts. He openly objected this ideology 
calling it bid'a and called for literal textual interpretation. In fact, the Hanbalis affiliated 
themselves to the people of hadith (ahl al-hadith) and ahl al-athar i.e. those who follow what 
has been inherited from the prophet and his companions (Watt 1994, 39; Mardini 2013, 5).  
They called for strict adherence to the Quran and Hadith and persistently rejected any 
interpretation of these sacred texts, other than the interpretations by early generations of the 
pious Muslims. It is from Ibn Hanbal’s creed that later Ibn Taymiyya adopted some of his 
ideas that were given to Salafi trend after the establishment of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s school 
(Lacroix 2009, 59). 
 
Following Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab began as a reformer who was 
interested in reviving the society. He believed that the Ummah (society) had become ignorant 
of the true teachings of their religion and immersed in a state of jahiliya (ignorance) which he 
believed to be the root cause of its political decline since Islam’s golden age (Meijer 2009, 4). 
He believed that the only way to regain salvation and glory (‘izze) was by the re-assertion of 
absolute monotheism (tawhid) as the basis of true creed. To achieve this goal, he condemned 
all actions that involve use of intermediaries to God, venerations of tombs of saints (al-
auliya) and regarded them as polytheism/shirk (Mousalli 2009, 4). Eventually, Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab and his movement flourished when the Saudi government made it the official creed 
of the Kingdom (Al-Rasheed 2002, 39). Today, the Salafi trend is widely divided with 




2.1.5 Typologies within Salafism 
In his article “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement”, Wiktorowicz (2006) categorized Salafism 
into three major groups, namely; the ‘purist’, the ‘politico’, and the ‘jihadist’ (Wiktorowicz 
2006, 208). His aim and argument, was to provide the composition of Salafi movement to 
help readers better understand the connection between notorious groups like Al-Qaeda to 
“similar minded non-violent fundamentalists and what sets them apart” (Wiktorowicz 2006, 
207). Since his publication in 2006, Wiktorowicz’s categorisation has been used and accepted 
by some scholars with occasional efforts to refine. For example, Muhammad Hafez (2007) 
accepts the distinctions but rejects the label “purist”. He prefers instead the term “apolitical” 
or “conservative” (Hafez 2007, 65).  Nonetheless, Wiktorowicz’s categorisation will be used 
to guide this study to help understand how Salafi actors manifest themselves in the political 
arena. The three categories are briefly discussed below: 
 
 Puritan Salafism 
Wiktorowicz defines ‘Purists’ as those who emphasize non-violent methods of da’wa 
(mission), purification (al-tasfiya) and religious education (al-tarbiya).  They generally say 
no to partisan politics and view it as “a diversion that encourages deviancy” (ibid. 208). They 
call for mandatory respect and obedience to rulers, “a classical Sunni principle” (Brigaglia 
2015, 185). The examples of this category are the scholars of the Saudi official clerical body 
known as the Council of Senior Scholars (Majlis Hay’at Kibar al-‘Ulama’).  This body 
advises the House of al-Sa’ud in private and avoids any public opposition to the government. 
This category is what Shiraz Maher (2016, 10) labels “quietist-advisors who prioritise al-






In contrast to ‘quietist-advisors’, ‘Politico-Salafists’ call for the application of Salafi creed 
into politics. They view the creed as the only just system for humanity that allows divine 
revelations of the right to rule (Wiktorowicz 2006, 208). A close example is the Saudi 
Awakening movement (sahawa) that composed of a group of scholars who came out openly 
to challenge the Saud government and asked for reform. Such category is directly engaged 
with political processes, lobby and campaign for “organic change in accordance with Islamic 
precepts” (Maher 2016, 10). Maher call them “activist-challengers” who air out their political 
disagreements with the rulers in public (Maher 2016, 10). Its members include, Saud’s 
Islamist public intellectuals; Safar al-Hawali and Salaman al-Auda, Tunisian Rashid 
Ghannouchi and Qatar based Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi (ibid, 189). 
 
Politico-Salafists/activist-challengers may call for political actions towards contemporary 
issues, but they are so critical on declaring revolution or violence. They can be active in 
accordance with Islamic precepts and can easily participate in peaceful demonstrations, 
international boycotts and sometimes take political positions in secular governments but not 
easily declare violent actions (Wiktorowicz 2006, 222). Indeed, as observed by Maher, their 
belief in maintaining social order and unity makes them reject radicalism and any type of 
revolutionary approaches (Maher 2016, 10). In fact, many Salafis who could be described as 
Political-Salafist, during the 2011 Arab uprisings, were critical of the uprising for causing 
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Jihadists in contrast, take up military alternative and argue that “current context calls for 
violence and revolution’ to establish an Islamic State (Wiktorowicz 2006, 225). Maher calls 
them “violent-rejectionists” (2016, 11). This category does not reconcile with the notion of 
modern state. They view it as a “heterodox affront to Islam whereby temporal legislation 
usurps God’s sovereignty” (ibid). They call for radical change of the modern system by 
confronting the agents of such governance. Once al-Qaeda declared: “We believe that the 
ruler who does not rule in accordance with God’s revelation, as well as his supporters are 
infidel apostates…armed and violent rebellion against them is an individual duty on every 
Muslim” (ibid). The main examples of this category is al-Qaeda, al-Shabab, Boko-Haram and 
IS. In fact IS has superseded al-Qaeda by not only rejecting constitutional politics or 





Additionally, similar to Politico-Salafists, Salafi-Jihadists disagree completely with the 
‘purists’. To them, ‘purists’ are representatives of rulers. They call them al-ulama al-Sulta 
which means ‘scholars of power’ or rulers (ibid, 227). Jihadists view these scholars as civil 
servants especially ‘purist’ Saudi scholars, and speak in their master’s language. For that 
reason, they show no respect to ‘purists’ scholars. Bin Laden once said: 
 
“The fatwa of any official alim (religious scholar) has no value for me. History is full 
of such ulama (clerics) who justify riba (usury), who justify the occupation of 
Palestine by the Jews, who justify the presence of American troops around Haramain 
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Sharifain (the Islamic holy places in Saudi Arabia). These people support the infidels 
for their personal gain. The true ulama support jihad against America” (in Rubin & 
Rubin 2004, 262). 
Additionally, Salafi-Jihadist also dispute within their ranks, the issue of ‘proper’ jihad. For 
example, Abu Muhammad al-Maqidisi9 believe that scholars like him - the intellectual guardian of 
jihad-Salafi movement - should guide the fighters, whereas the fighter themselves believe that their 
actual combat experience and practical knowledge gives them greater insight in jihad than the 
“bookish scholars (Wagemakers 2016, 502). Indeed, this is where Wiktorowicz’s model fall short. 
With this contestation, the model becomes too broad to capture the relationship between different 
actors within Salafi trend. 
In conclusion of this part, it is clear that beyond the headlines, the Salafi trend and its 
adherents a far from constituting a unified bloc. It is a broad community reflecting varied 
positions on many important elements in religion. Apple literature has been produced and this 
is just a glimpse on the broad topic.  
  
2.3 Theoretical framework 
In this section, I provide the theoretical framework of the study. The study is theoretically 
guided by two theories. That is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Persuasion/rhetoric 
theories. Both theories are important in examining the content of ADF sermons in order to 
identity the motive behind their activities. Additionally, the theories help in identifying how 
                                                          
9
Al-Maqidisi is a Jordanian scholar hailed by many jihadist movements for his support of ‘pure’ Jihad waged by 
certain fighters. He became an enemy of Saudi regime after calling for a violent overthrow of the Saudi 
monarchy in 1989 in his book: al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya fi Kufur al-Dawula al-Sa’udiyya (The Obvious Proof of the 
Infidel Nature of Saudi Regime). See for more: Wagemakers, Joas. 2012. A Quietist Jihad: The Ideology and 
Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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these sermons appeal to the desires of the young Muslims in Uganda. The historical section 
(chapter four) uses a combination of ethnography and archival work. 
 
2.3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
Chilton (2004) and Garner (2007), observe that religion make up a central part of human 
existence but less attention has been given to religious discourse (spoken and written), in the 
Critical Discourse Studies. Furthermore, Wijesen (2013) also affirms that, it is through CDA 
that a gap between theoretical and scientific approaches can be bridged and called up on 
religious studies scholars to undertake a multidisciplinary approach by incorporating CDA 
into their studies. Thus, in an attempt to examine the process of interpreting biblical texts by 
religious scholars on the issue of women leadership in churches, Kim (2016) stresses the 
usefulness of CDA in analysing the religious texts. Kim argues that using CDA, we can see 
how religious texts are used to assume and formulate a unified mental model to control the 
beliefs of the audience (Kim 2016, 58). 
 
Rooted from linguistic studies, CDA views language as form of social practice (Janks, n.d; 
Fairclough, 1995). As argued by Philips (2002), our access to reality is through language. 
“With language we create representation of realities that are never mere reflections of a pre-
existing reality but contribute to constructing reality” (in Lui 2015, 67). Thus since language 
(both in writing and speech) comes with both cohesion and coherence (Titscher et al., 2000), 
CDA performs the duty of analysis in order to provide a complete picture of a given 
phenomenon. 
 
Indeed, religious actors use both sermons and texts to reach the targeted audience. These 
sermons are self-consciously rhetorical and worthy of literal consideration. This indeed, 
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makes them open to “extensive linguistic and discursive in an immediate and direct way” 
(Tayob n.d, 1). Moreover, CDA seeks to reveal in this case how religious discourses are 
constructed such that a particular indoctrinating perspective can be “expressed delicately and 
covertly” (Lui, 2015, 103). However, one main concern with CDA is its deficiency in the 
analysis of social practice. Jorgensen and Philips (2004, 69) argue that because CDA 
possesses both discursive and non-discursive elements it is inevitable that it will not help 
analysing social practices. Thus, they propose to support CDA with other theories. 
 
2.3.2 Persuasion and rhetoric theory 
Persuasion is an attempt to influence a person’s belief, attitudes, intentions and behaviour 
(Seiter and Gass 2010, 33). Indeed, with persuasion, human beings have been motivated to 
war, terrorism, ethnic cleansing, genocide, racism, hysteria, religious intolerance and 
extremism, mass suicide and many other forms of unreasonable and uncontrolled behaviours 
(Kurbalija, 2010). Through rhetorical sermons and preaching, politicians, religious leaders, 
charismatic individuals have influenced behaviours, motives, and attitudes of people. This 
prompted American writer Dale Carnegie (d.1955) to advise; 
 
“When dealing with people, remember you are not dealing with creatures of logic. We 
are dealing with creatures of emotion, creatures bristling with prejudices and 
motivated by pride and vanity” (Carnegie 2005, 33).  
 
Thus with regards to persuasion and rhetoric theory, Daniel O’Keefe (2004, 31) observes that 
the systematic thinking about persuasion formerly begun as early as fifth century B.C.E by 
Greek scholars especially Aristotle. He argues further that persuasion is doing an important 
role in the daily life of individuals. Moreover, O’Keefe (2004, 32) identifies the most 
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fundamental function of persuasion to be attitude change. He argues that changing people’s 
mental state, as a precursor to behavioural change is the most important goal in persuasion. 
He observes further two main concerns of attitude change: valence and extremity. In this 
case, valence as a criterion to define emotions is concerned with positive or negative 
attractiveness of an argument. In other words, with persuasion, religious preaching can lead 
to ‘negative’ valence such as anger and fear or ‘positive’ one such as joy (Frijda 1986, 207). 
Whereas extremity, according to O’Keefe is simply a measurement of how personally 
involved an individual is with an argument (O’Keefe 2004, 32). 
 
Furthermore, O’Keefe identifies other additional properties to the attitude change, which are 
grouped all together under the “attitude strength” (O’Keefe 2004, 32). He argues that attitude 
strength is made up of persistence, resistance, impact on information processing and 
judgements and impact on behaviour.  He argues that stronger attitudes are more persistent 
and more likely to affect such process and behaviour than weaker attitudes (ibid.).  In this 
regard, it does not matter whether or not an individual or group of individuals have the same 
opinion about something, it is more like that, and the strength of their attitudes is not on the 
same level (Anaya 2015, 11). In that way, persuaders are also more likely to focus on 
individuals with weaker attitude strength in addition to valence and extremity (ibid). 
  
Besides attitude, O’Keefe (ibid) identifies mental state as another hotspot in persuasion 
theories. He observes that mental state includes normative considerations in which 
“descriptive norms” may incorrectly influence individuals to do or not to do something based 
on what individual thinks everyone is doing (ibid, 33). This can automatically lead to 
individuals do something which they would not have done, in order not to be considered out 
of character. In this case persuaders often concentrate on counteracting these 
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‘misconceptions’ of descriptive norm in order to convince them on the merits of engaging in 
certain activities (Anaya, ibid). 
 
Another important element in mental state is the subjective norm. In this way, individuals are 
more receptive to the opinions of important people in their lives (O’Keefe 2004, 33). It is 
theorised that parents for instance, have higher chances to influence their children towards 
certain behaviour than it can be with strangers. However, this of course may vary from family 
to family.  
 
Furthermore, using rhetoric tactics, a writer or speaker strives to persuade and motivate 
individuals in specific situations (Anaya 2015, 12). Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2014, 3) asserts 
that rhetoric skills do not operate unless there is an “insight” which entails with the proper 
empathy of the individual being persuaded.  Thus in possession of the insight, the speaker 
utilises that chance to exploit the “ideological, personal and contextual elements” in the 
rhetoric (Ibid, 13). In this regards, rhetoricians use rhetoric devices and appeal to two main 
elements: pathos and ethos (Anaya 2015, 12). 
 
Pathos is an appeal to emotions. It is defined as a way of convincing an audience to an 
argument by creating emotion response. Ethos on the other hand is an appeal to ethics. It is 
defined as a way of conceiving some of the character or credibility of the persuader (Anaya 
2015, 12). To this regard, Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2014, 88) observes that not only these 
modes of rhetoric appeals affect individual’s attitude and choice, but can influence biasness 
detected by emotions (in case of pathos) and in some cases even change an audience’s mind 
on a previously biased topic. Religiously, Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2014) argues that “the 
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enduring motive power exercised by the sacred texts of all major religious traditions” are 
often implemented by rhetoricians to align themselves with religious audiences (ibid, 88). 
 
In the theoretical framework that make the basis of this thesis, regarded both 
persuasion/rhetoric theory and CDA as essential in understanding the messages that are 
echoed by Islamists movements. By the use of these two theories, reading through the 







This chapter discusses the methodology used by the researcher. The methods adopted were 
helpful in obtaining the answers for the questions that guide this research and hence drawing 
the conclusion and recommendations. The study employed a combination of historical and 
ethnographic qualitative research methods using persuasion theories. The three questions are: 
What do we know about ADF, how ADF emerged in Uganda, and is ADF a Jihad-Salafi 
movement or political movement in disguise.  
  
3.2 Material 
This study used archives, particularly newspapers published in Uganda from late 1980s to 
present. This is the period in which ADF has been active in the region. The study further uses 
the recorded sermons of the ADF’s leaders. In this case, persuasion/rhetoric tactics were 
analysed to help in reading through sermons recorded by ADF leader. 
 
3.2.1 Archives 
Archival research was instrumental in gathering information about the history of the 
movement. The major materials used in this stage were the newspapers published during the 
initial stages of the movement. Two newspapers were identified with relevant information for 
the study. These include; 
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a. The New Vision 
The New Vision newspaper is one of Uganda’s oldest newspapers. The New Vision was 
established in 1955 by the colonial government with the name Uganda Argus (Chibita, 2006). 
When the current National Resistance Movement (NRM) came in power in 1986, the paper’s 
name was changed to New Vision. Thus by the time ADF activities started to unfold in early 
1990s, the paper was in place to report the happenings. 
 
b. The  Daily Monitor 
Daily Monitor was established in 1992. It is a privately owned paper with independent editors 
and journalists. Since its inception, the paper has been critical of government mandates. In 
numerous occasions, its premises have been raided by the government security agencies for 
different political reasons. The paper covered most of the stories on ADF. 
 
3.2.2 Audio Recordings 
There were many sermons recorded by Jamilu Mukulu, ADF leader, for persuasion purposes. 
However, his tape recordings were banned in the country by the government. This made it 
difficult for the researcher to have access to many of them. The researcher was only able to 
get one audio relevant to the study for analysis. Recorded in local language (Luganda) with 
the title “Okutta kw’Abasilamu e Mbarara (‘Muslim Massacre in Mbarara’-MMM). The 
audio was first released in early 1990s from one of Jamilu Mukulu’s seminars, which he used 
to hold throughout the country. The message in it resonates clearly with his jihad agenda. 
  
3.3 Procedure 
This section describes the primary research, data collection and analysis. 
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3.3.1 Primary research 
Primary research involved literature review in the library and perusing through newspapers as 
well as interviews with former members of the movement. This was important in responding 
to question one, which requires both historical and ethnographic analysis thus understanding 
the background, growth, organisational culture, current trend and future possibilities of ADF. 
Another source was the audio sermon of ADF leader, which was collected from one of the 
informants and analysed through persuasive/rhetoric analysis. This approach was essential to 
answer part of Research Question two and three.  
 
3.3.2 Data collection 
a) Archival Research and Interviews 
Data collection, precisely, started with archival research. This was not only important in 
identifying important dates in the history of the movement, but also getting the discussion of 
the public in media during that time. In this case, the focus was put specifically on stories 
published about ADF since its inception in early1990s as well as articles in newspapers on 
Muslim wrangles of late 1980s to date. Most of the archival research was conducted in 
Uganda at Kampala City Council Authority (KCCA) Public Library and Makerere University 
Main Library. 
 
Archives helped in refining interview questions. Indeed, from the library, the researcher 
could comfortably take on the interviews with clear picture of the situation before and after 
the insurgents. Semi-structured interviews ensued with former members of the movement and 
later with one member at Uganda Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC) who was also an active 
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Salafi member in 1980s. This was the early stages of the movement before some of its 
members started violence in early 1990s. Respondents related stories and situations they were 
faced with before and after joining the movement. They explained how they joined the 
movement as well as their personal challenges in the movement until their final decision of 
quitting. 
 
Among the interviewees was a close associate of the movement’s leader. He was his personal 
friend and finance manager responsible for all finances and merchandise of the movement. 
He was in direct connection with the financers and contributors, both local and international 
as well as those from within East Africa. Other three were movement’s ‘ulamas’ and field 
commanders. Two live in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and the other in Uganda. They had 
important information on the history of the movement from its inception as a dawa 
(missionary) group in Uganda to militancy. Additionally, was the interview with the member 
of kikosi feka-feka (destabilising wing). This group was responsible for planting bombs in 
Kampala
10
, assassination of government officials, army officers among others. They had been 
also in prison at least once or more. They all refused recording on ‘safety’ grounds but 
allowed taking notes, accept one who leaves in Dar es Salaam. They also preferred 
anonymity of which I had no objection to since I was interested in the information given.  
 
Lastly, three other respondents were also interviewed. These ones were older in age and had 
been active in Salafi activities before violent elements appeared in the movement. The first is 
Sheikh Saliman al-Faris who is a ‘retired’ Salafi preacher and activist. In his 70s he retired 
                                                          
10
 See for example: Els De Temmerman. 2007. Uganda: ADF Rebellion: Gorilla to Urban Terrorism. The 
Newvision, May 21. Accessed on Feb 16, 2017 from http://allafrica.com/stories/200705220110.html.  
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from public appearance and can only be found at his home mosque, which is named after his 
name for congregational prayers. He had information on the history of Salafism in Uganda 
and the public life of ADF leader before his conversion to Islam. The second is Haji Nsereko 
Mutumba who is currently the spokesperson of UMSC. He was also an active member of the 
Salafis in Uganda during their initial stages. Lastly, Sheik Sulaiman Kakeeto who is currently 
the Amir (leader) for another faction of Salafi group under the organisation knowns as 
Uganda Muslim Tabliq Community (UMTC). He has been active in Salafi activities and had 
a lot to share.   
 
b) Audio Sermons 
Audio MMM was critically analysed by listening to it several times using persuasive/rhetoric 
tools to identify evidences of appeals to pathos and ethos.  As earlier stated, Pathos (appeals 
to emotions), refers to a way of convincing an audience to an argument by creating emotion 
response. Whereas, ethos (appeals to ethics), refers to a way of conceiving some of the 
character or credibility of the persuader. 
  
The audio is nearly 40 minutes, with a clear rhetoric message directed to his audience. He 
starts with reminding Muslims how non-Muslims hate them. He then reminds the audience of 
Prophet Muhammad’s engagements with ‘disbelievers’ in Macca and how they plotted to kill 
him. There upon he divulges into the topic of Muslim massacre in Mbarara (Western Uganda) 
after the fall of Amin. In it, he narrates the story of a pregnant woman whose stomach was 
ripped open, with a machete and foetus crudely torn out. He reminds them, “You think those 
Christian neighbours love you so much, wait when the tables turn, they will disdain you”.  
Mukulu’s approach is quite similar to that of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. As argued by 
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Thurston (2015), Boko Haram uses a mixture of exclusivism and victimisation in their 
rhetoric to mobilise Muslim youths into their militant activities. Indeed, analysis of the audio 
MMM reveals presence of appeals to both pathos and ethos. The tables below illustrate the 
findings. 
 
Table 1: Illustrates the appeals to pathos found in the MMM audio 
No. Appeals to Pathos 
1 “your brothers in west were slaughtered like goats” 
2 “perpetrators are still living freely waiting for another chance” 
3 “Do you think that they will love you? In fact, this one example is enough to know 
them and what they conceal in their breasts” 
4 “if an opportunity rises, wait, even your ‘Aunt’ will cut your throat” 
Source: Field Data (2016) 
 
From table one, the first example “your brothers in west were slaughtered like goats” and 
“perpetrators are still living freely waiting for another chance”, are emotional appeals that 
target attitude change. He reminds Muslims of the atrocities done by Christian mobs in 
Western Uganda in 1979. Using the term ‘goat’, he appeals to degrading emotions. In other 
words, he is persuading his audience not to wait, but rather get ready to fight. In this way, he 
persuades the audience to change their attitudes towards fighting so that they do not fall prey 
again, like what happened in 1979. This attitude change builds on victimisation to trigger 
militant actions. 
 
Moreover, “perpetrators are still living freely waiting for another chance”, in this statement, 
there is an indication that the current regime led by President Museveni knows the 
perpetrators but does not come to take action. By doing this, he is persuading his audience to 
hate the regime and get ready to fight it. This rhetoric persuasion meets the needs of the 
persuader using concrete evidences that cannot easily be challenged. Indeed, such persuasion 
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prepares the audience for sacrifice and fearlessness and changes their attitude towards the 
desired goals of the speaker. 
 
Similarly, “Do you think that they will love you? In fact, this one example is enough to know 
them and what they conceal in their breast” and “if an opportunity rises, wait, even your 
‘Aunt’  will cut your throat”, which are the third and fourth example. They also conform with 
character that appeal to pathos. The speaker in these examples appeals to attitude change 
towards their non-Muslim relatives. In Uganda, almost in every family there are people of 
different religions (African Tradition Religions [ATR], Catholics, Muslims and Protestants) 
who usually live side by side in peace. 
 
Thus in his persuasive tactics, Mukulu mentions the dangers even within family relations. 
Mentioning that someone’s aunt can surrender her sister or brother’s son or daughter, is to 
point to the highest level of treachery a woman can do within the family. This is so, because, 
in Uganda, aunties and uncles occupy positions similar to mothers or fathers
11
. Therefore, this 
was an appeal to pathos to have his audience change their attitude towards close non-Muslim 
relatives including parents. Indeed, Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2014) affirm that the main 
purpose of pathos is to “denote all kinds of emotional influence on the audience, potentially 




                                                          
11
An example, in Buganda culture and language, a Father is called “Taata”. His children must call his brother 
also “Taata. The same with mother whom they call “Maama”, her sister should be called “Maama”. It is 
intended to strengthen family bonds. See: Onyango, O. Eria. n.d. Ugandan Traditional Cultural Values. Accessed 
on July 28, 201 from https://www.academia.edu/1937342/Ugandan_Traditional_Cultural_Values.    
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Table 2 illustrates appeals to ethos found in MMM 
No. Appeals to ethos in MMM 
1 “and they will not cease from fighting you until they have made you renegades 
from your religion, if they can” 
2 “O you who believe, when you encounter unbelievers in the battle, never turn 
your backs to them” 
3 “And if those who disbelieve fight against you, they will certainly turn their 
backs, then they will not find neither a protector nor a helper”   
Source: Filed Data (2016) 
 
In order for the audience to give credibility to the speaker, Mukulu, recites a verse in Quran 
(2:217), which is in example one: “and they will not cease from fighting you until they have 
made you renegades from your religion, if they can”. With this example, the speaker aligns 
himself first to his audience, and presents himself to be part of those who are being fought by 
the ‘non-believers’. This indeed, coincides with what Hyde’s (2004, 13) observation that for 
successful appeal to ethos, the speaker “must appear to share personal similarity with the 
audience” (Hyde 2004, 13).  
 
Moreover, examples two and three; “O you who believe, when you encounter unbelievers in 
the battle, never turn your backs to them” and “And if those who disbelieve fight against you, 
they will certainly turn their backs, then they will not find neither a protector nor a helper” 
appeals to ethos. Cockcroft and Cockcroft observe that, the “emotive power exercised by the 
sacred texts of all major religious traditions should be recognised as a form of ethos” 
(Cockcroft and Cockcroft 2014, 88). Indeed, the speaker supports his words with religious 
text of the Quran to align himself with his “religious audience” (Anaya 2014, 14) and achieve 
the symbolic status of the representative of ‘authentic religion’ in the eyes of his audience. 
 
3.5 Limitations  
The researcher encountered numerous challenges during the course of the study. First, ADF 
is a sensitive issue in Uganda and the East African region at large. Being a Muslim youth it is 
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even worse since most of the group’s members are affiliated to Islam. Many innocent youths 
have been arrested in Uganda in suspicion of being ADF members later to be found innocent. 
Moreover, few individuals can freely give information to strangers about ADF. This 
sensibility antagonised the earlier plan to have many interviews especially with former 
members of the movement. This could help in acquiring variety of information from different 
people and angles. Although the research questions were clearly explained, but still many 
prospects expressed reluctance at speaking on behalf of the movement, whilst others felt 
uncomfortable to speak about their engagements since it may result into security problems 
with either the government or ADF itself. One respondent for example told the researcher 
frankly, “the first time I saw you, I thought that you are Mukulu’s agent sent for a mission” 
(Field Work Interview-FWI, 2016). It was after presenting introduction letter from the 
department of religious studies-UCT and university students card. 
 
 Additionally, some demanded facilitation in monetary terms, which I instantly declined on 
ethical grounds. In this case, I had to explain my stand and politely left such respondents. I 
had also planned to collect information from the active members of ADF. However, it proved 
difficult due to security reasons. In this case, I decided to stick to the former members but 
with careful conclusions especially on their negatives against the movement. For security 
purposes, the respondents who accepted the interview, especially the former combatants 





4.0 ADF IN UGANDA 
4.1 Introduction 
As seen earlier in chapter one, ADF is a rebel movement that has been in existence since 
1996. What is not contended is that, this movement is an Islamic extremist group that uses 
terrorism with little regard to civilian causality. From the data collected, it is important to 
unveil the historical events that took place in Uganda in regards to Ugandan Muslims before, 
during and after colonialism. Thus in response to the three research questions, i.e; 1) what do 
we know about ADF, 2) how did it emerge in Uganda, 3) is ADF a Jihad-Salafi movement or 
political movement in disguise -  this section, addresses the historical circumstances that 
created the group. This will take us one journey back, to understand the history of Islam in 
Uganda, followed by a detailed account on the rise of ADF and its current developments. 
 
4.2 History of Islam in Uganda 
The arrival of Islam in Uganda dates back to 1844 in the central (Oded, 1974, 39) whilst in 
the north, it is said to have spread in early 1800s, because of the stationing of Sudanese 
soldiers led by Emin Pasha (ibid, 150). These soldiers settled in the West Nile sub-region due 
to developments in Sudan, during the era of the Mahdi movement. In the central region, 
historians trace the roots of Islam to the arrival of Arab traders from the East African coast. 
The first Muslim trader to arrive in central Uganda was Ahmad bin Ibrahim, who introduced 
Islam to the Buganda King Suuna I (Oded, 1974, 39). Apolo Kaggwa
12
 narrates: 
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Apolo Kaggwa was a major intellectual and political leader in Uganda under British rule. He served as katikilo 
(Prime Minister) of Buganda under Kabaka Mwanga (r. 1884 -1897) and then Kabaka Dauda Chwa (r.1897 - 
1939) between 1890 and 1926. He grew up in the king’s palace as a young page during Kabaka Muteesa and 





 Ibulaim rebuked Kabaka Suna for killing people every day saying: “there is 
Katonda [the creator god or Allah] who created us and you too, and he gives you this 
kingdom to rule your people.” Suna replied: “I know there are many balubale [spirits] 
who gave me this kingdom.” Ibulaim went on preaching, but Suna paid no attention, 
till finally he [the Kabaka] said: “Who is this Katonda you go on talking about? Is he 
greater than I?” Ibulaim said: “He is above and he will raise all whom he loves.” 
therefore Suna asked to ‘read’ and read four chapters of the Qur’an before Ibulaimu 
left for good” (King, Kasozi, & Oded 1973, 3). 
 
In 1856, King Suuna I died before completely embracing Islam and was subsequently 
succeeded by his son Muteesa I. Unlike his father, Muteesa was keen to adopt the new 
religion. However, what should be noted here, he embraced the new religion while holding on 
his traditional beliefs. He did this primarily, to establish strong ties with Arab traders who had 
weapons which could be used to strengthen his kingdom, while maintaining support from 
traditional chiefs (Robinson 2008, 158).  
 
Nonetheless, in early 1860s, Muteesa adopted Islam and publicly identified himself as a 
Muslim. He learnt to read the Quran, studied both Swahili and Arabic. Buganda sources 
affirm that Muteesa was an apt student
14
. In a very short period, he became fluent in Arabic 
and memorised some parts in the Quran. He further spread the religion to his subjects starting 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Etheredge, Laura. 2008. Sir Apolo Kaggwa: Prime Minister of Buganga. Encyclopaedia Britannica, December 15. 
Last updated Dec. 15, 2008. Accessed from, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Apolo-Kagwa. 
13
Usually in Buganda, Ahmed and Muhammad are shortened to Medi. 
14
While describing Kabaka’s enthusiasm for Islam, Ham Mukasa a Muslim in the early days of Muteesa’s reign, 
who later became a Christian, said, “He was diligent in everything he was learning. This is why he was able to 
learn Muhammad’s religion and to speak Swahili” (Mukasa, Ham. 1938. “Simuda Nyuma [Forward Ever, 
Backward Never.” London: S.P.C.K). 
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with the chiefs. Ham Mukasa who was a young page at the time narrated, when Muteesa 
accepted Islam, he called on his chiefs and said: “there is only one God; called the Great, God 
the omnipotent, Hakibalu...I want you all to study this religion” (Mukasa 1938, 14). He 
assured them further that this God is greater than balubale, the spirits which Muteesa and his 
subjects used to worship. As expected, all Chiefs responded in affirmative and said, “you sir, 
have more wisdom than we, in understanding difficult things such as these. If you appreciate 
and accept them, so do [us]. Let us embrace the religion; since you are there to teach us to 
know all and understand about God” (ibid). He started teaching them the new religion and 
some of what he had learnt. 
 
To affirm his strong belief of Islamic faith, Muteesa ordered for the construction of a large 
mosque in the capital in which he led prayers as Imam and head of Muslims in the country. In 
the mosque, he appointed caretakers and commanded his subjects to frequently take 
important supplies such as cows, goats, (for meat), bunches of Bananas and other foodstuffs 
(Oded 1974, 69). In 1867, Muteesa officially observed Ramadan and from that year he 
strictly kept the ritual. When he was unable to fast e.g. during Busagala war of 1868, Muteesa 
compensated the days he missed in the later days and commanded even his subjects to do the 
same. By late 1860s, Islam had become the official state religion of the Buganda Kingdom, 
with significant number of converts (ibid). 
 
So enthusiastic of his new religion, Muteesa sent a mission to his historical rival, Omukama
15
 
Kabalega (r. 1870-1899), the King of the neighbouring kingdom, Bunyoro which was 
rejected. This made Muteesa sad and said, 
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Omukama is the title given to the King of Bunyoro Kingdom, western Uganda. See for more details: Stokes, 
Jamie. 2009. “The encyclopaedia of the Peoples of Africa and the Middle East”. New York: InfoBase Publishing, 




“I am very sorry that brother of mine has rejected the religion of God and 
has trusted in his own dignity and his gods alone. I regret that he thinks 
only in terms of this present life to which he compares  the life to come. 
Let it be so, but I feel sorry for him to remain in the ancient customs of 
the balubale whom we called gods while there is the true God , the creator. 
You, my subjects, however, persevere in the religion” (Mukasa 1963, 17). 
  
Mutesa’s reign is remembered to have been autocratic. One incident, in particular, as 
recorded by Oded (1974, 77) is related to a group of Muslims who had complained to the 
King because he had refused to undertake the Muslim ritual of circumcision in favour of the 
custom (ibid)
16
. When these Muslims refused to pray behind him, he sentenced them to death 
by burning leading to death of more than seventy of the culprits (ibid, 160). It should be 
noted here that there is controversy among the four main Muslim legal schools on 
circumcision
17
. According to Shafi’i school, the ritual is compulsory. However, the school 
waive to a person who embraces Islam and feels afraid of the consequences. Moreover, they 
contend that it is not a condition for validity of person’s profession of accepting Islamic faith 
or the performance of religious duty (Al-Sabbagh 1996, 16). 
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In Buganda, the King’ blood is never willingly shed (Oded 1974, 77). 
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Some scholars such as shaf’I, Ahmad Ibn Hanbali make it compulsory, while Malik, Abu Hanifa and many 
other scholars maintain it to be sunna (permissible but not obligatory). The famous hadith quoted is the fitra 
(human nature) hadith. The Hadith says: “Sound human nature is in five things: Circumcision, removal of pubic 
hair, plucking of armpit hair, trimming of the moustache, and cutting of the nails” see details on this topic; al-




It was while these controversies were raging, that the British explorer, Henry Stanley arrived 
in the mid-1870s. Although, British missionary and author Rev. Robert Ashe in his book Two 
Kings of Uganda (1889, 40) and in Chronicles of Uganda (1894, 55), argue the opposite, 
other books such as African Holocaust by J.F. Faupel (1964), and Bassekaba ba Buganda 
(‘Buganda Kings’) by Apolo Kaggwa (1901) all agree that the incident happened shortly after 
the arrival of Stanley. Therefore, it is difficult to rule out the influence of Stanley’s presence 
for Kabaka’s decision of killing Muslims. This is also evidenced in Stanley’s letter, which 
appeared in the Daily Telegraph of November 15, 1875
18
. Stanley wrote: “I have indeed, 
undermined Islam so much here that Mtesa has determined henceforth, until he is better 
informed, to observe the Christian Sabbath as well as the Muslim Sabbath” (Stanley 1899, 
164). 
 
Indeed, Stanley’s visit changed the whole dynamics of Islam in Buganda. The king became 
aware of the existence of another powerful foreign religion. He learnt that this religion 
(Christianity) possess people with technical superiority, greater force, wider resources and 
more wealth compared to Arabs and that he can even utilise such advantages. His confidence 
strengthened with the arrival of Christian missionaries to Buganda in 1877 (Oded 1974, 221). 
 
Bringing with them resources and arms that were superior in comparison to those from the 
Arabs, once again, Muteesa welcomed the new visitors and allowed them to preach and 
spread their religion. Missionaries attempted to convert him to their religion. However, there 
is no strong evidence for his serious acceptance of the Christianity as seen with Islam. To 
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Stanley said that, after his long conversation with the king, he found him so open to the possibilities of 
Christianity. He immediately sent a letter to the queen requesting for missionaries. By June 1877, missionaries 
had started arriving in Uganda. See the letter in details and more about his exploration work in Africa in; 
Stanley, M. Henry. 1899. through the Dark Continent. London: George Newness, (p. 164). 
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keep the balance, he remained undecided to which religion to follow but later towards his 
death, he confessed to be a Muslim
19
. The introduction of Christianity to the kingdom 
however, marked the beginning of religious conflicts in the years that followed.  
 
4.2.1 Muslim-Christian Hostilities (1888-1892) 
In 1884, Muteesa died of smallpox. Prior to his death, religious scuffles between Muslims 
and Christians had already started in the kingdom. Both religions wanted influence over the 
king and the Buganda kingdom. Religious identity was now more clearly than ever attached 
to the state. The identity of the king, and particular customs such as circumcision or baptism 
was vital for kingship (Robinson 2004, 164). Both Muslims and Christians supported 
Mwanga, Muteesa’s a son who had no religious affiliation but with hope from each religious 
group that he will convert to their religion.  
 
It is argued that Muslims quickly approached Mwanga and warned him that Europeans and 
Christians wanted to take over his kingdom since some of the converts had started disobeying 
his orders (ibid). To avoid loss of his leadership, in 1885, Mwanga arrested Christians and 
killed those who refused to renounce their faith (Faupel 2007)
20
. He became sceptical with 
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Oded (1975, 285) recorded this incidents in detail. He writes; “On June 30, 1880 the Kabaka got up very early 
in the morning in an unusually jovial mood and ordered all his chiefs to be summoned immediately. When they 
were all seated, he informed them that he was happy because of a dream he had the previous night. He saw 
the moon surrounded by ten other moons. The central moon suddenly grew bigger and bigger and when it 
attained an enormous size all the others made obeisance to it. At that time, Muteesa was seated on his throne 
in the assembly hall. Then two angles unexpectedly appeared to him and with a look of anger, which made him, 
tremble asked him why he had stopped reciting “Allah Akbar.” They ordered him to say these words if he 
wished to retain his kingdom and to prosper. Muteesa immediately began to recite “Allah Akbar” and then he 
woke and realised that all this was a dream.”(Oded 1975, 285) 
20
Kabaka Mwanga succeeded in killing 30 young Christians in 1885 for defying his orders. Indeed, these martyrs 
were honoured by Pope John Paul II’s visit in 1969 and in 1993, as well Pope Francis visit in 2015. See: Faupel, F. 
J. 2007. African Holocaust: The Story of Uganda Martyrs. Nairobi: Pauline’s Publication Africa, (a revised edition. 
First published in 1964). Muslim Martyrs see: Katumba, Ahmed and Welbourn, B. F. 1964. Muslim Martyrs of 
Buganda. The Uganda Journal, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 151-163. 
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Muslims also and conspired to kill also their leaders. However, the plan did not prosper. The 
plot linked to Muslims and immediately fought Mwanga with support from Christian 
survivors (ibid).  
 
Eventually, Mwanga fled the kingdom and his brother prince Kiwewa was crowned. 
Unfortunately, he did not enjoy the throne for long. Muslims who were strong in number and 
arms wanted him to be Muslim. He had to convert and accept circumcision. However, out of 
fear, he coincided with Christians and plotted to eliminate Muslims. Muslim found out the 
plan and war erupted again. Kiweewa was captured and arrested, making him rule for only 
three months. Christians who fought on his side were also forced to leave the kingdom 
(Twaddle 1972, 54).   
 
After this victory, Muslim proceeded to crown Kalema another son of Muteesa. He had 
accepted Islam and circumcision. They quickly named him Rashid, and started an Islamic 
state with “a radical reordering of society along Islamic lines” (Ward, 1991). This victory 
persisted between 1888 and 1890. In early 1890s, Rashid Kalema’s rule was challenged by 
local Christians who with direct support from European missionaries (mainly Protestants). 
Reports affirm this battle was funded by Charles Stokes a British trader who supplied the 
Christian army with arms and ammunitions (Oded 1975, 308). Since they needed a king from 
Muteesa’s children as per the custom, they again asked Mwanga who had sarcastically 
accepted Christianity and became their standard-bearer. By late 1889, Christians managed to 
defeat their Muslim counterparts (Robinson 2004, 164). 
 
The battle resulted in quite a number of scores from Muslims and many others arrested, and 




“After the defeat, Arabs locked themselves up following the example of Mackay and 
Mapera
21
, and these Europeans were in the end allowed free passage to their friends 
by the Muslims. But our enemies massacred the Arabs; they were burnt at their rest 
house at Natete, though they were guests in the country” (King, et.al 1973, 12). 
Muslims who survived regrouped in Kijungute, today’s Western Uganda under another son of 
Muteesa, Nuh Mbogo. Rashid Kalema, their Muslim kabaka had succumbed to smallpox in 
the course of the struggle (Robinson 2004, 164). 
 
Britain at this time had also dominated the area against any other contender and it was not too 
soon that Uganda would be declared a British protectorate in 1894 (Savege 1961, 81). 
Moreover, Captain Fredrick D. Lugard
22
 (d. 1945) the representative of the Imperial British 
East African Company (IBEACO) in Buganda supported the Christian parties especially the 
Protestants to consolidate their control of the kingdom (Robinson 2004, 165). As principal 
administrator in the region, he allocated all positions of bureaucracy and provinces to 
particular leaders based on religious affiliation and Muslims
23
 did not fare well in the new 
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This is the Luganda name of the catholic French White Father, Fr. Simeon Lourdel mon pere 
22
Fredrick Lugard was employed as British military administrator of Uganda. He was instrumental in calming down the 
Protestant-Catholic conflicts of early 1890s. This Protestant-Catholic conflict allegedly was fuelled up by one of the French 
catholic priests, Father Achte in his letter published in Europe. He wrote: “The fight with Muhammedan was 
hardly over, before it became needful to begin another and far more arduous battle with the Protestants.  It 
seemed to us to be the most opportune time to make an energetic forward movement towards the extension of 
Catholicism, and stirring up the dogmatic zeal of the Catholic chiefs. I will inspire the Catholic army with 
courage” (in McDermott P. 1893. British East Africa: A History and Formation of the Imperial British East African 
Company. London: Chapman and Hall, (p.162). IBECO transferred the administration rights of the territory to British 
government in 1893 and in 1894, Buganda became officially the British Protectorate and incorporated into broader Uganda. 
23
Lugard had successfully persuaded Muslims to surrender their weapons and return peacefully something, 
which Christian did not like. However, Christian missionary A. M. Mackay had earlier sent a letter to England 
containing useful information about the state of affairs in Uganda and had warned them about the threat from 
Muslims. He wrote: “the Arabs in Karema’s train (meaning the defeated exiled Buganda Muslims), have 
intimated their intentions to invite aid of the Mahdi’s troops in Upper Sudan to enable them to take position of 
50 
 
arrangement (ibid).  Similar pattern continued with other British authorities that came after 
Lugard. It is recorded that once Sir Harry Johnston, a special commissioner for Britain in 
Uganda between r. 1899-1901, wrote to a Residential Commissioner (RC) in Busoga (Eastern 
Uganda) confirming colonial administration’s stand in relation to Muslims that; 
 
“It is not in the interest of the British government that Mohammedanism should 
receive any more adherents than we can help in Uganda as Muslims are proverbially 
difficult to manage and are always in their heart opposed to the administration of 
Christian power” (in King et.al 1973, 15). 
 
Consequently, all the influential positions in the country fell in the hands of Christians. They 
controlled almost everything including education - the central tool for social development. In 
case of deficiency, they could call in money from fellow Christian friends in Europe and 
America to build schools and to teach their children science and technology (King et al 1973, 
22). Muslims had no rescue in addition to their internal differences. In fact, after his visit to 
Uganda in 1953, 1963 and 1964, Joseph Schacht (1965) wrote: 
 
“it was expressed to me, the Muslims had been reduced to the role of hewers of wood 
and drawers of water….in present Uganda, the Muslims as a group do not play any 
considerable part in Public life…they are the least educated group, they are out of 
white-collar jobs” (Schacht 1965, 96). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
both [B]Unyoro and [B]Uganda. I scarily think that the fanatical dervishes who have seized Emin Pasha’s 
province will be any more tolerant towards Muscat Arabs than they have been to Egyptians. At any time unless 
the Imperial British East African Company are prompt in securing some definite understanding with [B]Uganda, 
and are in position materially to aid the present government there, that country with all its valuable 





This situation continued prior to, and after independence
24
 and the various post-colonial 
governments did nothing to solve the situation. The loss of Muslim powerful status within the 
ruling class, coupled with a lack of Western education led to a shift in their social and 
economic status. They largely resorted to work as butchers, taxi and bus drivers, and 
shopkeepers. In fact, by the time Uganda gained its independence in 1962, there were only 
two Muslims with bachelor’s degrees in the country, the late Abubakar K. Mayanja (1929-
2005) and Ally K. Kirunda (b. 1935) (Sengendo, 2004). 
 
The colonial government also implemented the Buganda agreement of 1900 that allocated 
land and counties to government, religious institutions, their individual collaborative chiefs 
and the Kabaka in favour of their religious allies (Kateregga, 2012). Protestants and Catholics 
received their share, the chiefs and the king, and nothing was left for the ‘Muhammedan’. 
The only share they could claim was given to “Prince” Nuh Mbogo. It was on this land that 
Mbogo gifted his co-religionists with the opportunity to build a Mosque. Moreover, in the 
allocation of the counties, out of the eighteen counties that make up Buganda kingdom, 
Muslims were allocated one small, impoverished and arid county (Kateregga, 2012). This 
discrimination according to Mazrui (1971), Kateregga (2012) and Chande (2008), denied 
Muslims access to wealth and socio-economic development and sowed widespread ill feeling 
towards their fellow citizens and the government. Muslims became “second class citizens” 
(Kiyimba, 2012), under subsequent governments following their failed attempt to establish a 
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Uganda independence in 1962 and colonial government handed over powers to Ugandans. The first 
ceremonial president Sir Edward Muteesa, and Milton Obote became the Prime Minister similar to British 
system of governance. Obote changed this system later in 1966 who became both president and prime 
minister.    
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state controlled along Islamic lines. The situation continued in the same direction until the 
rise of General Idi Amin in 1971 (Kiyimba, 2012; Chande, 2008). 
 
4.2.2 Amin’s Regime 
The coming to power of Idi Amin was seen by Muslims in Uganda as a second chance to 
regain their glory. Amin took over power through a coup-d’état in January 1971 and 
immediately changed the politics of the country (Oded 1974, 313). Initially, his objective, 
method and behaviour did not reflect a person ready to change the status of his co-
religionists. However, after 1972, the story changed to sway his efforts to favour Muslims 
(Kasumba 2015, 19). With no regard to public opinion, Amin embarked on a campaign to 
rejuvenate Muslim identity in the country. Muslim titular leader Badiru Kakungulu, who had 
just been released from the prison, sent him a congratulatory letter saying, “We Muslims have 
added reasons to feel grateful for your Excellency, since under the previous regimes our 
religion had been debased to a play thing and we had been denied the most elementary 
freedom of worship” (Kasumba 2015, 15).    
 
One of the earliest points on his agenda as a Muslim president was to redress the religious 
imbalances created by both colonial and post-colonial governments. He started by uniting 
Muslims under a centralised governing body, the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC) 
and putting all Muslim groups under his authority (Kateregga,2012; Oded 1974, 315). 
Muslims had been divided since the death of their first leader Prince Nuh Mbogo. Although 
never turning physically violent, their resentment had even caught the attention of the 
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colonial government (Kasumba 2015, 10).
25
 Amin allocated 12 acres of land for UMSC in the 
middle of the city. While officially handing it over to Muslims, Amin proudly stated, 
 
“The top, and undeveloped area, of Old Kampala Hill, which I have personally 
inspected, covers an area of 12 acres……This will enable the supreme council to 
build its Headquarters there, housing the Secretariat of the council, and the 
offices…… I would also like to have on this land a Mosque and a Jaamiu-
Esalaamia..., which I hope in time, will have branches in other parts of Uganda. The 
standard of this institution is equivalent to that of a university. This institution will be 
open to persons from other parts of the world, especially Africa, Asia and Latin 
America... I have played my part in trying to put religious affairs in order. I have done 
it for the church of Uganda and I have done it for the cause of Islam in this country. 





He went further to promote Muslim education in both Islamic and secular sciences. He laid 
the foundation for the establishment of the Islamic University in Uganda (IUIU), and various 
Muslim teachers’ training colleges and schools. Moreover, with the official Muslim 
population of less than six percent (Bozdogan, et al. 2007, 181), Uganda became a full 
member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which allowed the country to 
receive financial assistance to build mosques, schools. Furthermore, his openness to support 
the Palestine struggle, led to strengthen his politico-social and economic bond with the Arab 
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Kasumba (2015) and Kateregga (2012), attribute the problem to Christians led by Sir Apolo Kaggwa, the 
famous katikkiro of Buganda during early colonial times. For more read Kasumba, Yusuf. 2015. Islamophobia in 
Uganda and Kateregga, Badru. 2015. “Causes of Muslim Wrangles in Uganda”   
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The speech was shared by UMSC spokesperson during fieldwork, Jan 2017.   
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world and the Middle East. In 1972, King Feisal of Saudi Arabia visited Uganda. This visit 
strengthened the relationship between Uganda and Saudi, an alliance that opened doors for 
young Muslim students to study at the Islamic University in Medina (Chande 2000, 355). A 
Great numbers of young Muslims of all levels went for Islamic studies in a University known 
for being the architect of Salafism.      
 
Overall, Amin’s era was the time for Muslims to flourish again in Uganda. Conversion to 
Islam was encouraged and highly praised by the president.
27
 Every year, mawlid (festival 
marking the anniversary of the Prophet’s birthday) celebrations were officially organised 
under the patronage of special envoys from the army. Reports were brought to the President 
from various mawlid celebrations with lists of new converts (Oded 1975, 315). On April 11, 
1978, however, the eight years of Muslim glory was again challenged, when Amin was 
ousted by Tanzanian troops (Acheson-Brown 2001, 9). 
 
4.2.3 The Bloody Vengeance   
“Twaheza omuti, amataaju naganyu” (we have cut the tree [Amin], the branches [Muslims] 
are yours). This statement is attributed to the fighters who ousted Amin in April 1979 
(Kiyimba 2012). Following the statement, an incident reported to have happened in June, 
1979, when a mob of Christians armed with spears and machetes rounded up Muslims in 
Western Uganda and tied their hands behind their backs. They were then assembled at River 
Rwizi, and mercilessly butchered, with an Imam’s head cut into three pieces before being 
thrown into the river (ibid). Unforgettable on this day, is an incident that occurred to Madiya 
Nakitende, a seven month pregnant mother. Her stomach was sliced by angry men, foetus 
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The first page of the Voice of Uganda, noted on Dec. 11, 1972 “four hundred fifty five people were converted 
to Islam during one mawlid which was held at the Simba Battalion Camp at Mbarara.” 
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removed and her remains thrown into the river. Her story was narrated by her mother a 
witness who survived by throwing herself into the river (ibid.). Between March and June 
1979, 67 Muslims were killed in the sparsely populated Sheema district (ibid). 
 
Similar events occurred in the northern parts of the country, such as in Arua, Koboko and 
Yumbe districts. In these areas, victims were both Muslims and non-Muslims from Amin’s 
tribesmen of Kakwa/Nubi tribe (Chande 2008, 105). Irrespective of their political 
involvement with Amin, many lost their lives and/or properties by troops, angry neighbours 
and mobs. Even UN aid agencies could not grant them support as their guilt was implicitly 
assumed (Virmani 1996, 251). The most widely documented incident is the Ombaci 
massacre, for which a truth and reconciliation program has recently commenced.
28
 Here, 
soldiers raided various villages in Arua and Yumbe, killing indiscriminately. They then sought 
those who had taken refuge at the St. Joseph Community College and at the adjacent church. 
More than 2,000 people were massacred by random firing and torture (Erima, 2015). In this 
climate of violence, persecution and mistreatment, many Ugandan Muslims and Amin’s 
tribesmen went into exile in the forests of DRC (then Zaire) and Sudan, not to return until 
early 1990s (Chande 2008, 105). 
 
4.3 Setting the Stage for ADF 
Amidst the political turmoil of the post-Amin years, some Muslim youths who had travelled 
to Middle East for studies in Islamic sciences had started to return. They were mostly from 
Saudi Arabia. The returnees seemed to be more vibrant and ready to articulate their newly 
acquired knowledge and identity not only to Muslims but also to those in power (Chande 
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2000, 355). Salafism is the dominant theology officially recognised by the Saudi government. 
The returnees had been trained in the similar theology. Their methodology or manhaj (as seen 
in Chapter two) is opposed to traditional Islam that was being practiced in Uganda by then. 
The theology preaches a stricter form of Islam with strong criticism of traditional Sufi 
practices such communal dhikr (remembrance of God) and shafa’a or intercession (Maher 
2016, 14). 
 
At the same time, in the early 1980s, the country also witnessed the arrival of Jamaat al-
Tabligh. This movement originates from the Deobandi school of Indo-Pakistan and their 
preaching is directed to grass-root Muslims to ‘correct’ their practices and bring them in line 
with the ‘right’ Islamic teachings. The movement requires its members (mostly male) to leave 
their homes in small groups for varying periods, to teach and invite others to join the 
movement (Janson 2014; Metcalf, 1996).
29
Although the Salafi and Deobandi schools have 
substantial differences, many Salafis in Uganda became activists within the ranks of the 
Tabligh movement, later parting ways to start their own movement (Chande 2000, 3). For this 
reason, local Salafis in Uganda are called, ‘abatabuliki’ literary meaning the ‘Tablighs’ (FWI 
with Salman, Jan 2017). 
 
They also utilised the young educated Muslims who were active in Muslim Students 
Associations (MSAs) especially Makerere University Muslim Students Association 
(MUMSA), Muslim Students Association of Uganda (MSAU) and Uganda Muslim Youth 
Assembly (UMYA). MUMSA represents all Muslim students of Makerere University, while 
MSAU unites all Muslim students in Uganda in institutions of higher learning. Then UMYA 
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Metcalf, Barbara. 1996. Islam and women: the case of the tablighi jama’at. SEHR, vol. 5, issue 1; also more 
detailed account of the movement see; Marloes Janson, “Islam, youth and modernity: the Tabligh Jama’at in 
Gambia” London: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
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unites all Muslim intellectuals. For this reason, it is not a coincidence that the main members 
in UMYA have either been leaders in one of the two aforementioned associations. These 






 were active 
in raising awareness of the current happenings in the Muslim world to the Muslim youths of 




Salafis intensified their activities that included preaching against what they assumed to be 
bid’a. This tempted the old folks (bazeyi) to deny them access to main Mosques. For that 
reason, they began conducting their activities in open places and in some few mosques that 
allowed their teachings (FWI, January 15, 2017). By late 1980s, the movement had gained 
support from young Muslims in central and eastern parts of Uganda. “Whenever, the bazeyi 
chased us in their mosques, we looked for another space to teach our people. We called it 
open university, travelled in every part of the country preaching the sunna of the prophet” 
(ibid). 
 
Important to note is the group’s involvement in the inter-religious debates. This had 
remarkable effects so much so that in 1984, a Church catechist Steven Kyagulanyi converted 
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Kasozi, is currently the vice chairman UMYA and Imam at Mawanga Mosque, Munyonyo (Kampala suburb). 
He is also a sociology lecturer at IUIU. 
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Kiyimba is the current chairperson of UMYA and Professor of literature at Makerere University-Kampala. 
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Kyanjo graduated from Makerere University in late 1980s. He was active in MUMSA, MSAU and UMYA. He 
joined active politics and served as opposition Member of Parliament for two terms (2005-2010) and (2011-
2015) where he served as a shadow minister for presidency. He was very vocal and critical to the government. 
In August 2014, Daily Monitor described him as “one of the brightest lights of 9
th
 parliament” and “most vicious 
figures”. He is now suffering from dystonia, which he said was a poison he got in his parliamentary trip to 
Johannesburg South Africa. See: Mpagi, M. Charles. 2014. Kyanjo Opens Up on his ‘Poison’ Scare. The Daily 
Monitor, May 3, from http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/Life/MP-Kyanjo-opens-up-on-his--poison--
scare/689856-2302658-1py936/index.html, retrieved on July 23, 2017.     
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See also Mukisa, Farahan. 2015. Recounting Attack on Uganda Muslim Supreme Council Headquarters. The 
Daily Monitor, August 4. 
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to Islam. Kyagulanyi was later to be called Jamilu Mukulu the founder of ADF movement. 
After his conversion, he immediately began learning Islam with the local Salafi sheikhs. They 
later applied for scholarship for him in Saudi Arabia, where he took a two-year Arabic 
language course. When he returned home, he started preaching right away. His charisma and 
rhetoric made him to receive huge number of followers especially from the youths (FWI, 
2017). 
     
The Salafi mission came to its pivotal moment upon the increased Muslim leadership 
wrangles at UMSC. It is important to not to forget that, the fall of Amin led to collapse of 
UMSC leadership as well as Muslim unity in the country (Kateregga 2012). Tribalism took 
up its course again, between Baganda and non-Baganda tribes each claiming leadership. In 
late 1980s, it was between Sheikh Rajab Kakooza (Buganda) tribe and Sheikh Saad 
Luwemba (Busoga). Salafis supported Kakooza not only because he was from Buganda but 
also because he had also studied Islamic sciences extensively compared to his counterpart. He 
studied in Pakistan and Medina University for high school and undergraduate respectively as 
well as in Egypt’s al-Azhar for post-graduate studies. Luwemba had not gone much far in 
education compared to Kakooza. Besides that, youths accused Luwemba of being a follower 
of Shia branch of Islam. 
 
The two sheikhs went into numerous court battles each one claiming to be the legitimate 
leader of Ugandan Muslims. Finally, the magistrate court confirmed Luwemba and ordered 
Kakooza to quit UMSC headquarters. This event was the catalyst that transformed the first 
generation of reformist Salafis in Uganda, led by Jamilu Mukulu, into a full-fledged jihad-
Salafi movement (Chande 2000, 356). For Mukulu and Salaf youths, Kakooza was better than 
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Luwemba. In fact, they used to say 'tetuyinza kujawo mulwadde ate netussawo omufu' 
(loosely meaning ‘we cannot replace a sick (Kakooza) for a dead (Luwemba)’ (FWI, 2017). 
 
4.3.1 Attack at UMSC 
Exploiting Muslim political and religious fragmentation, on Wednesday March 22, 1991, 
more than 500 Muslim youths attacked the UMSC headquarters and took it over (Abbey 
1991). The attackers claimed for the need to rescue Muslim independence from government 
interests and to purify the National mosque from the leadership of ‘non-Muslims’. It should 
be noted that, the March 1991 attack at UMSC was the second time. They had tried to occupy 
the premises previously in 1990, only to leave after government intervention. Hajat Syda 
Bbumba (treasury manager in Uganda Development Bank but later became a government 
minister) on behalf of the government had successfully convinced the youths to vacate 
UMSC peacefully, with a promise that the government would solve their discomfort with the 
Muslim leadership in an amicable manner as soon as possible. However, sources from the 
interviewees affirm that the plan was already unveiled in 1989 in Bombo (21Km from 
Kampala along Kampala-Gulu Road) at Haji Kadara mosque, in a secret meeting of Salafi 
top leaders from all over the country. The meeting had resolved, among other things, to elect 
their own leader who will be different from the UMSC leader, and to establish a jihad wing 
which will take over the country from non-Muslims, but which would start with cleansing the 
UMSC headquarters from “people of bid‘a”.  
 
Those who attended the meeting include, among others: Yunus Kamoga;
34
 Jamilu Mukulu; 
Muhammad Kiggundu; Abdulkarim Sentamu;
35
 my interviewee (name withheld on request). 
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They elected leaders like Yunus Kamoga as an official Amir (amir known by the public) and 
Jamilu Mukulu as speaker, but also as the secret Amir for the jihad wing. As the head of Jihad 
wing, according to the Bombo meeting Jamilu Mukulu became the overall Amir for all 
Salafis in Uganda, a decision that later led to a huge controversy among Salafis when 
Kamoga, the official Amir for the public, renounced violence and plans for jihad. 
 
During preparations for the second attack of UMSC, both Kamoga and Jamilu - the two 
leaders - had addressed the angry youths in a lecture that lasted for two hours at Nakasero 
mosque, the main Salafi mosque in Uganda. In his address, Mukulu reminded the youths 
about the mismanagement of Muslim properties spearheaded by leaders of UMSC. He 
appealed to his followers to sacrifice their lives for the sake of Islam. He reminded the youth 
about the incident at UMSC in 1990, and that they were assured by the government not be 
victimised after withdrawing from UMSC. However, later Kamoga was sued for damaging 
UMSC property, which was tantamount to dishonouring the agreement (FWI, 2016). 
 
Using persuasion and rhetoric tools, Mukulu informed the angry youths that the government 
was planning to grant the Muslim headquarters - the only prime property Muslims own in the 
city-to “non-Muslim Shias using Sheikh Luwemba” (FWI, 2016). This ‘moved’ the angry 
youths who viewed Shi’ism as a greater enemy to Islam than anything else (ibid). In fact, 
almost all Salafis share this view globally. Jihad-Salafis such as ISIS, Boko Haram and Al-
Shabab apply this animosity by killings and bombing of Shia mosques (Cockburn 2015, 2). 
Whereas non-violent ‘Purists’, make them the main subject of their criticism as the case with 
Saudi-Iran conflict. Thus on their match to the UMSC, youths were chanting Allah Akbar 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
35
He is a Medina graduate and hadith specialist. He avoided main leadership but he was the most learned 
among the salafis. He was so respected within salafi ranks, so much so, that when they broke away as we shall 
see, all the factions continued to respect him. 
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(Allah is great) and saying “we cannot accept such ruling, how can Luwemba ‘omukubi 
webitabo’ (‘fortune-teller’) and a Shia, who believes in Mawlid, and ‘okwabya enyimbe’ 
(traditional funeral ceremonies) be our leader?” (Nsereko, 2017).   
  
On this fateful day, youths occupied the UMSC Mosque and headquarters kicked out the 
acting mufti Kakooza. The government engaged and pleaded with the youths to respect the 
judgement and vacate the premises unconditionally, but all was in vain. The occupation lasted 
for three consecutive days. As Mukulu was engaged in other duties, Kamoga, Sentamu, 
Kiggundu and other Salafi leaders finally accepted government demands. However, Mukulu, 
who missed the meeting, rejected the proposal. He immediately rushed and addressed the 
youths about the plot that will let their struggle and sacrifice yield to nothing. He cautioned 
them not to take heed of anyone including Kamoga and Sentamu who will try to change their 
intentions. He lamented, “This is either victory or martyrdom” (FWI, 2017). 
 
Mukulu further scoffed at Salafi Amir (for general public), Kamoga and Sentamu (their 
respected hadith scholar) for taking such decision without consulting him, the overall leader. 
Because according to Bombo meeting, Jamilu Mukulu, the Amir of Jihad wing had to be 
consulted for any decision that involves fighting. Because he was the overall Amir for all 
Salafis in Uganda, according to the meeting. At this moment, “many of us decided to remain 
with Jamilu Mukulu, willingly or unwillingly to avoid falling among the ‘hypocrites’ who 
disobey the commander of the Muslim army” said one of the interlocutors who was part of 
the movement since its inception in 1989.   
 
The situation intensified and eventually, the government responded as expected by sending 
riot police (Abbey 1991; Young 2015, 186), which failed to force the youth out of the UMSC 
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headquarters (FWI, 2017). At the end of the confrontation, four police officers, one attacker 
and four canine dogs were killed (Ssegawa 2015). Later, the government reinforced the police 
with a military police who later overpowered the Salafi youths, leading to the arrest of over 
400 youths including Jamilu Mukulu, Muzafar Mulinde, among others (FWI 2016). Other 
leaders such as Kamoga, Sentamu, Kiggundu were not arrested as they had previously 
accepted government proposal and vacated the premises. 
 
4.3.2 Rebellion Plan Hatches 
While in prison, Mukulu met Joseph Lusse, a businessperson, who had been arrested on 
treason charges. He advised Jamilu to turn his group into an armed force. However, this was 
just an additional trigger to Mukulu, since he had already endorsed the ‘master plan’ for an 
‘Islamic Uganda’ in the Bombo meeting few months before attacking and occupying UMSC 
headquarters. . In this case, the prison was the hatching centre. In fact, the group had started 
training some youths using Kiguddu’s garden in Namagoma. According to my interlocutors, 
during the day, youths under training, could pretend to be engaged in brick making project, 
while at night military training take course. This training had already started in early 1990 
few months after Bombo meeting. 
 
Furthermore, Jamilu identified some Salafi members in the prison who had served in the 
National Resistance Army-NRA (currently called UPDF). These included Kigozi Swaib alias 
Kasangaki to avail the jihadists with military skills. Jamilu unveiled his plans saying, 
“Comrades, you know we cannot oust ahl-bidae (‘innovators’ i.e. Sufi sheikhs), they have 





Other Salafis who survived the arrest, remained indoors hiding, while others including 
Kamoga –the Amir, and their respected hadith scholar Abdulkarim Sentamu fled into exile for 
fear of government arrest that followed UMSC attacks. The salafi community was left with 
no leader and their mosque was now occupied by the bazeyi (elders)-their main rival by then. 
Sheikh Sulaiman Kakeeto
36
 a member and Salafi preacher had been in Riyadh for studies 
during the UMSC attacks. On his return in 1992, few of the Salafis re-organised and asked 
Kakeeto to act as their Amir. Kakeeto narrates: 
 
“When I finished studies in Saudi Arabia and returned, I found so many problems 
here (i.e in Salafi community). More than 400 tablighs[salafis] were in prison and 
Nakasero Mosque (Salafi mosque), was occupied by elderly(non-Salafis). Those few 
who were not arrested had relocated to Katwe-Kinyoro mosque in Kisenyi, that is 
where they had their prayers. Others stayed indoor, in fear of being arrested because 
the situation was so fragile. Sheikh (Sulaiman) Ssesanga suggested that we mobilise 
people [salafis] to go back to Nakasero mosque. From there we would also mobilize 
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Sheik Sulaiman Kakeeto is now the leader of Uganda Tabliq Community (UTC), a salafi group that was formed 
in 1992 by the youths who survived UMSC arrests in 1991 and other Salafi returnees who had not been in the 
country during the attacks. However, in 1995, UTC also split out due to leadership wrangles within Salafi 
scholars in the country. Some members of the group such as Sheikh Abdulkarim Sentamu, Sheikh Abdulhakim 
Sekimpi, among others asked Kakeeto to resign and make way for new leadership but he refused. They decided 
to break away from him and formed another salaf group called the jamu’at al-Dawa al-Salafiyya and Sheikh 
Sekimpi became their acting Amir (Amir al-Umma). In 2008, Yunus Kamoga returned from exile, joined 
Sekimpi’s team. He was immediately reinstated as their Amir. In 2011, Kamoga and his team forcefully occupied 
Nakasero Mosque, which houses UTC headquarters and chased away Sheikh Kakeeto. To prevent violence 
between the two factions, the government intervened and requested the two parties to choose a neutral 
imam. However, Kakeeto was not allowed by Kamoga’s team to occupy his offices again. He was only accepted 
to pray in the mosque. His offices are now located few meters away from Nakasero mosque. In 2015, the two 
factions agreed to bury their differences and work together for common goal. See for more: Kiggundu, Joseph, 
and Ssenakbirwa Al-Mahd. 2011. Kakeeto thrown out as Muslims foil Nakasero Mosque Demolition. The New 
Vision, January 13. Accessed on August 29, 2017 from http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/2466686-1088982-
format-xhtml-ljm54cz/index.html, on Kamoga’s return see: Olita, Rauben and Tebajjukira, Madinah. 2008. 
Kenya Deports Uganda Muslim Cleric. The New Vision, December 1. Accessed on august 29, 2017, from 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1175918/kenya-deports-ugandan-muslim-cleric.    
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resources to help those in prison and their families. The main challenge then was there 
was no leader; they approached me and asked me to become their leader. I turned 
down the offer because the group they wanted me to lead was comprised of 
aggressive people; I told them that I am naturally mild and could not match the pace 
of their aggressiveness. They continued pushing me, Sheikh Muhammad [Yunus] 
Kamoga and Sheikh Abdul-Karim Ssentamu had exiled themselves in Kenya. They 
both wrote persuading me to become the Amir. With too much pleading from several 
people, I accepted. The uphill task ahead of me was primarily to solicit assistance for 
people in prison and their families and to get a lawyer who can take up the case of 
prisoners. With help from Muslims, we got a lawyer and he took the case, they started 
releasing the prisoners slowly. The prisoners would walk from Luzira (maximum) 
prison to Nakasero Mosque, from where we would give them aid to their home” 
(FWI, 2017).   
 
At this moment, Salafi was getting a new face and approach under Kakeeto’s leadership. In a 
bid to become autonomous from UMSC, Salafis also registered their organisation as Uganda 
Tabliq Community. They owned their mosques and conducted programs with Nakasero 
Mosque as their headquarters. Furthermore, Kakeeto with his team agreed on means to end 
tension with UMSC leadership. Kakeeto narrates:  
 
“I opted for a liberal approach and I went to UMSC and met the Mufti Saad Luwemba 
and requested to work with him. Luwemba thought I was looking for another way of 
overthrowing UMSC again…we talked for very long time and he finally accepted to 
work with us. I requested him to allow the deputy Imam of the UMSC to come from 
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our side, he accepted and we sent there, Sheikh Abdu Mubiru, the rest remained at 
Nakasero as our base” (ibid).  
After successfully reconciled with UMSC, Kakeeto and his team turned to the 
government. They wanted an instant end to the tension between Salafis and the 
government. The government was still sceptical of all Salafi youths. They opted to ask 
the government to recognise their presence as Muslims youths with an autonomous 
leadership similar to UMSC. This recognition required the government to grant the 
Amir a vehicle, and a VIP passport. Kakeeto recounts: 
 
“I was the Amir of the country but riding on a bicycle whenever I needed to attend 
any function. The board members of Nakasero resolved to meet the president, and 
request him to give our Amir a vehicle, and a VIP passport, a Bus to transport our 
Imams, among other things. He welcomed our move to work with government; he 
gave us a vehicle, double cabin and a VIP passport. Our relationship with the 
president and the government improved drastically” (FWI, 2017).    
 
When the news of a reconciliation program reached Salafis in prison, Mukulu immediately 
snubbed the move. To them such alliance with non-Muslim president and ‘Luwemba’ (whom 
they branded to be a Shia) could not be accepted. Jamilu as recounted by one of the 
informants “had another plan for us” (FWI, 2017). It should be noted that, besides rejection 
of bid’a, and takfir, the concept of ‘al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, is one of the necessary 
characteristics for jihad-Salafists (Maher 2016, 13). The concept refers to loving and hating 
for the sake of Allah. In jihadist understanding, ‘al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ requires one to ally only 
with the Salafis whenever they are found against disbelievers even if it is against their own 
relatives. Interestingly, later, Jamilu also accepted alliance with non-Salafi and non-Muslim groups, 
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which lead to the formation of what today known as Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) as we shall see 
in few paragraphs to come. 
 
Mukulu was released in 1994 with his indoctrinated team and reunited with other detainees 
who preceded his release. They formed a more radical group and immediately stated 
preaching hate messages against Museveni and mainstream Salafis. They further defied 
Kakeeto’s leadership that had charted a new path for the Salafi movement. Kakeeto had 
denounced violence and helped establish the Salafi movement as an autonomous religious 
group with its own mosques (FWI, 2016).
37
 Mukulu immediately denounced Kakeeto’s 
moderate policies, and in August 1994 formed his own movement, the Salafi Foundation, 




Sheikh Kakeeto recounts: 
“When the last group came out of the prison, they started abusing us that we are 
pagans. They were led by Sheikh Jamilu Mukulu. Whenever they came to Nakasero 
Mosque to pray, they would stand aside and wait until we finish our Salah [Muslim 
daily obligatory prayer], then they would pray alone saying we cannot pray with 
pagans. We reached a point and asked them to leave our mosque if we are not 
Muslims, so that they can pray in a place where there are Muslims. They refused. 
Sheikh Abdulkarim [Sentamu] was the leader of Imams; we sat and resolved to flog 
them if they come back. They came back during Isha’ prayer, our boys were ready 
with lashes, when they were in the middle of prayer, and the boys flogged them, and 
                                                          




rushed, never to come back. When these people left Nakasero, they set up their base at 
Mengo from where they continued to launch verbal attacks against us” (FWI, 2017). 
 
4.3.3 Formation of Salaf Jihad Council (Sajico) 
Mengo, a Kampala suburb, became the centre for Mukulu and his activities. Faithful to his 
objective, Mukulu started to put his recruitment plan into action (FWI, 2017). It was at 
Mengo (Kampala), in August 1994, that a national executive committee was elected. Jamilu 
Mukulu retained his previous position as the overall Amir and head of the Jihad wing. They 
further agreed to name the jihad wing as Salafi Jihad Council, under the leadership of Jamilu 
Mukulu. This is an interesting fact, because “Jihadi-Salafis” is usually considered to have 
been adopted as a self-appellation by militant Salafi movements, only a term is used only at a 
later stage, and reluctantly. According to Hegghammer (2010), most Jihadist movements 
refrain from using this term: “if we examine the jihadist literature more closely, the term is 
not nearly widely used as a self-appellation as often assumed. For starters, some of the actors 
most closely associated with the term, have themselves distanced from it” (Hegghammer, 
2010: 252).  
 
Based on the outcome of my fieldwork, we can conclude that Jamilu Mukulu’s movement 
might have been one of the first, or perhaps even the first, Salafi-Jihadist movements to use 
the term as a self-appellation. This claim is supported by an interview conducted on January 
5, 2017, with an informant who was an active member of the movement since its inception 
(FWI, 2017). Moreover, most studies on Islam in Africa tend to see African Muslims as mere 
recipients of ideas developed elsewhere. This findings of my thesis, on contrary, and similar 
to what has been done by Chanfi Ahmed (2015), in his study of the contribution of West 
Africans to early Salafism in Medina. Indeed, both findings demonstrates the agency of 
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African Muslims and their capacity to appropriate and develop the language of Muslim 
theology in ways that, in this particular case, are even precursors of similar developments in 
the rest of the Muslim world.  The table below illustrates the rest of the members of the jihad 
committee. 
Table 3: Illustrating Salaf Jihad Council  
Name Position 
Jamilu Mukulu Amir/Chief of Stuff 
Ismail Buikwe Deputy Amir/in charge of morals and prayers (dawa)  
Swaibu Kigozi alias Kasangaki Director of Intelligence   
Muhammad Kasira  Member 
Abdallah Yusuf  Member/in charge for acquisition of arms and 
purchase 
Source: Field Data, 2017 
 
The table illustrates top leadership of Salaf Foundation of 1994. 
Table 4: Illustrating national executive committee for Salaf Foundation in 1994   
No.  Name  Position  
1 Jamilu Mukulu  Overall Amir/Chief judge 
2  Muzafar Mulinde  Amir public affairs (similar to Kamoga) 
3 Abdalla Yusuf Chief Prosecutor 
4 Ismael Buikwe Amir Da’wa 
5 Sharif Mukyotala Treasurer 
6 Idris Mugalula Advisor  
Source: Filed Data 2016 
 
In addition to the above, the National Executive Committee for the Salaf Foundation had 
other coordinators in the different districts all over Uganda. These coordinators could assist in 
recruitment exercises to boost operations for the Salaf Jihad Council. According to my 
informant, the recruiters were instructed to do their work based on both ideological and 




Interestingly, besides having experienced killers and assassins organised in command 
structure ready for rebellion, this committee acted as a fully-fledged government in selected 
areas, where the implementation of strict Sharia laws was expected to be enforced by all 
abiding members. In the presence of Jamilu Mukulu, the chief judge, Abdallah Yusuf used to 
be in charge of executing penalties for offenses that requires punishments like flogging (80 
lashes for fornication, and 40 lashes for alcohol-drinking). The Council limited itself to 
flogging and refrained from executing penalties like amputation and stoning) in order to 
avoid attracting the attention of the government. Several instances of flogging of unmarried 
members of the group who confessed fornication occurred according to my informants. All 
this was carried in their mosque in Mengo (FWI, 2016). For adulterers, a record was kept. 
They were to be stoned at a later stage when the country acquire Sharia laws. 
 
On this note, one of my respondent recalls, “We had a special book in which all names of 
those who confessed adultery were noted. They had made tawba (repentance) and were 
asking us (leaders) to cleanse them from sins. Therefore, we decided to keep a special book 
with names of all offenders promising them that when we would establish an Islamic state, 
the Sharia law will take its course as required. And indeed, we stoned some of them later who 
joined our Islamic state in the DRC forests” (FWI, 2016). 
 
Besides implementing Sharia law, the Council also operated its own meat abattoirs under the 
supervision of representatives of the national executive committee. This was because the 
group believed that any meat slaughtered by other Muslims was not to be considered halal 
(lawful). In Uganda, Muslims operate all public abattoirs, and the UMSC is responsible for 
coordinating the Muslim butchers who operated in these abattoirs. Having delegitimized the 
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leadership of the UMSC as “un-Islamic”, it was natural for the Council to also establish its 
separate informal abattoirs.  
    
To improve their economic status, Sharif Mukyotara, their treasurer, who owned shops in 
Kampala city, reserved one of the rooms for the group’s official work. They went ahead and 
started a business dealing in importation of cars and spare parts. Mukulu ordered some youths 
to start armed robberies aimed at boosting their business. They targeted small and large-scale 
businesses and shop owners. Highway robbery was cheered in which some innocent lives 
were murdered in due course. “We killed many innocent lives in this initial stage” regretted 
one of the interviewees as tears dropped. “It was really jahali [ignorance]” (FWI, 2016). 
Members also targeted armed police officers and security guards for gun collection plans. The 
weapons were to be used in the jihad against the Ugandan government. In fact, during my 
archival research, I encountered numerous stories of anonymous robberies against business 
stores, and banks, as well as murders of police officers, being recorded in the New Vision and 
the Daily Monitor newspapers between 1994 and 1997. It is possible that at least some of 
these events are to be connected to the activities of the Mukulu’s men.   
 
4.3.4 Rebellion Plots Link 
With the idea of transforming Uganda into an Islamic state at the back of their minds, Mukulu 
and his group found Buseruka as a suitable ground for training. Busereka is an area in 
Western Uganda (in Hoima district) with a thick and impenetrable forests. Hoima town is 
approximately 225km from Kampala and Buseruka is 40km away from Hoima town. 
February 25 1995, is the day recounted by Brig. Godfrey K. Taban, a UPDF commander of 
the second division, who commanded the first attack against Salaf Training Camp in 
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Buseruka. On this day, the UPDF smashed Mukulu’s training camp, killing one hundred and 
capturing only twelve. Brig. Taban narrates: 
 
“There was a young man who was grazing cattle in the area and had seen people 
training. In the area, there was a cave in the lower plains of Hoima. The people 
training had asked the man to supply them with milk. The boy became our contact and 
guided our people to the exact location. He was taken to Masindi (a nearby district) 
were Kashaka was the commander. When the Mzee (President Museveni) rang me to 
prepare a force of two companies (about 300 soldiers), we readied a well-prepared 
force for operation under the late Emanuel Ruuija. The herdsboy was the guide and 
was picked from Hoima. The forces found Mukulu’s men on parade. Going down 
from the uphill to the valley was not easy, because the rebels could see you from their 
camp below. When our forces attacked, many rebels were put out of action, some 
were captured and Mukulu escaped with some men via Lake Albert into DRC. The 
forces also captured some ammunition including guns, but also Quran and pamphlets 




Contrary to Brig. Taban’s narration, one of my interviewee, who was also one of the twelve 
people captured by Brig. Taban’s brigade, does not believe that Mukulu was present in the 
camp at the time the Buseruka incident took place. He rather confirms the alternative reports 
according to which Mukulu was always in Kampala recruiting (FWI, 2017). Another member 
of SaJiCo (ADF), whom I interviewed in Kampala on 6
th
 January 2017, confirms this 
argument too. This member said: 
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This interview is recorded in monitor newspaper see: Account of the UPDF General who ordered first Attack 
on ADF. The Daily Monitor, August 7, 2015. 
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“I was one of the few who received news of Buseruka attack within the SaJiCo camp 
that was operating in Kampala. Of course, it was not a surprise because security 
agents had arrested one of our members, Abdulkarim Lukolero, while transporting 
food to Buseruka camp. On receiving the news of Lukolero’s arrest, Sheikh (Mukulu) 
fled to Kenya just a day before the Buseruka incident. He completely knew that 
government will immediately target him for arrest, since Lukolero was known to be 
member of the Salaf Foundation” (FWI, 2017). 
 
The Buseruka incident prompted the government to start arresting members of Salafi 
Foundation/SaJiCo, including Sheikh Muzafar Mulinde, the Salafi Foundation Amir. 
 “Those of us who survived security arrest kept on hiding. Hassan Waliggo, who had 
survived the Buseruka attack, returned from Congo, informing us that Sheikh 
(Mukulu) was in Congo and has ordered all SaJiCo/Salafi foundation members to join 
him as soon as possible. On hearing this information, we all left, leaving out only 
those who were responsible for the recruitment project” (FWI, 2017).       
          
4.3.5 Formation of Allied Democratic Forces 
Prior to Buseruka incident, the Salafi fighting group was not called ADF. It was known 
within their own circles as SaJiCo (Salaf Jihad Council). However, in DRC, Salafis found 
other dissidents of Ugandan origin. These included National Army for Liberation of Uganda 
(NALU) among others. With consent and support from Mobutu Seseko (d. 1997) the DRC 
president by then, Mukulu and his team formed an alliance with NALU in Bunia, eastern 
DRC in June 1995 (FWI, 2017). Formed in 1986, NALU is a composition of both political 
movements and marginalised populations in Western Uganda who shared opposition to 
Museveni’s government (Prunier 2004, 383). They largely operated across the border in 
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DRC’s Beni and Lubero territories where its members shared ethnic ties and longstanding 
political and economic links with DRC’s Nande community (Titeca & Fahey 2016, 1193). 
They had carried out some attacks between 1990 and 1992 in Uganda but remained an 
ineffectual fighting force until their alliance with Mukulu hence formation of ADF.    
 
Immediately after the alliance, Salafi-Jihadist youths dominated the force. Now the question 
rises. Salafis believe in al-wala wa al-bara’, how can they form alliance with non-Salafis, 
and more so non-Muslim. This requires a little of explanation. I asked my respondents this 
similar question and received divergent answers. One interviewee said; 
  
“We were weakened by Buseruka attack and the arrest of our members in Kampala. 
We could not put up any resistance. We had no weapons, even no food to feed…just 
know we had nothing!  Here, we had to pretend first, as non-Muslims to fit in the 
NALU camp or people who do not have any Islamic agenda, but just people who were 
fed up of Museveni’s government. This could help us fit in their ranks. We called this 
camouflaging. We started drinking alcohol, eating pork to make sure that no one can 
recognise our identity. However, one or two members remained with their identity 
strategically to take up the role of converting us to Islam. So, after few weeks, one by 
one started ‘converting’ day until we were all back to our normal days. But we did all 
what a non-Muslim  does……unfortunately, some members got addicted, and some 
were later executed for indiscipline cases caused by drug addiction” (FWI, 20016). 
 
Analysis of the above quote raises some answers to the question, why Salafis make alliance 
with non-Muslims to the extent of even hiding their identity. It seems alliance was 
permissible considering their status at the time. However, later when other Salaf members 
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from Kampala joined them, their number increased which gave them audacity to reveal their 
identity. In fact, on the sixth, January 2017 interviewee, when asked about this question, he 
said, “we allied with them, but they were under our control”. He affirmed, “We do the 
alliance with non-Muslims as long as the top leadership remains in us, this gives us room to 
command the rule of Islam within the camps and enhance conversion” (FWI, 2017).   
 
By mid-2000s, former NALU diehards had either left the movement or converted to Islam 
and remained with ADF Salafis (Titeca & Fahey 2016, 1193). Moreover, by early 2000s, the 
ADF had established a well-organised society in the forest, Northeast of Beni that boarders 
Uganda with DRC. Amidst regular military operations by both Uganda army, ADF leadership 
maintained a series of ‘sharia-governed’ camps that contained mosques, schools, health 
centres, courts, police force, an internal security force, and a prison (ibid). They also 
maintained regular relations with local business and political leaders as well as contacts with 
national and international financers. All this in pursuance of overthrowing the Ugandan 
government and establishing of an Islamic state. 
 
Over the past decades, ADF’s threat to the Kampala government has reduced. According to 
the United Nations Security Council report of 2014, ADF now has concentrated on 
maintaining cohesion within the members with harsh punishment to anyone who escapes. 
The leaders are now more focused on survival in DRC than overthrowing Ugandan 
government. They have ceased making public proclamations, stayed away from social media 
and tightly control movement within the camp, allowing very few members to travel outside 
their ‘controlled territories’ (UN Security Council, 2014). This has reduced the number of 
escapees and by 2014, just before a major military operation, ADF force was estimated to be 
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between 1600 to 2500 men, women and children (Titeca & Fahey 2016, 1194). In April 2015, 
Jamilu Mukulu was arrested in Dar es Salaam Tanzania where he was living since June 2014. 
 
In general, ADF has been generally weakened but not defeated. Chances of regrouping and 
rebuilding are many, with Mukulu or without him. It has more commanders who typically do 
not involve into combat operations but help them survive the attacks (FWI, 2017). Although 
the government hailed Mukulu’s arrest as “the latest in the string of victories we have 
registered against ADF”, the group continues to freely operate in DRC. Funded by mainly 
UK Salafis of Ugandan origin, ADF remains a great threat to peace in the region (Bagala, 
2015). 
 
4.4 ADF Infamous incidents 
4.4.1 First ADF Attack 
On November 13, 1996, about 600 ADF armed with rifles launched their first ‘official’ attack 
on three main locations; Mpondwe, Karambi and Bweera. They overpowered the Uganda 
army that guards this boarder and occupied the area for three uninterrupted days. Under the 
command of Abdullah Yusuf, Kasangaki and one of my interviewee, ADF continued 
progressing with hope of capturing Kasese District. “We never wanted to go back in DRC. 
Our plan was to cut off Kasese district and establish a base where we could easily get 
supplies using the Kasese airbase” (FWI, 2017). “We zealously fought hoping Kasese to fall 
into our control” (ibid). 
 
However, UPDF re-organised and responded mercilessly killing more than two hundred, and 
capturing eleven. Many of the ADF fighters committed suicide to avoid captivity “Our boys 
had grenades to die with rather than surrendering to the enemy” (FWI, 2017). The army also 
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recovered about 96 SMG guns, five RPG, 2 LGs, 20 hand Grenades, 22 pieces of 40mm 
MGL (Multiple Grenade Launcher), among others (Ssegawa 2015).  Finally, UPDF forced 
ADF rebels to retreat to DRC. However, on their way, they planted landmines, which later 
maimed many peasant farmers of the area.     
 
Having lost Kasese base, ADF began carrying out terror attacks in Kampala and other major 
cities in Uganda. They mainly targeted government officials, army officers and sometimes 
civilians. Grenades and bombs started to explode from bars, restaurants and public buses. In 
response, the government security agencies embarked on indiscriminate arrest of suspected 
members of ADF. Many Muslims went missing and extra-judicial tortures in what the 
security agencies called ‘safe houses’ became the norm of the day. The situation worsened 
after the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bomb attacks on the two American embassies in August 
1998. Uganda CID, ISO and FBI employed all torture measures as a means of forcing the 
suspects to affirm their connection with ADF. “They could hung and tie you upside down 
then mercilessly beat you up as well as immersing you into a tank of water plus threats of 
executions” recalls one of the respondents (FWI 2016, 2017). They were denied to seek any 
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Kevin Aliro is one of the victims who was intimidated by security agents for publishing a story on the torture 
in the daily monitor in 1998.  The story entitled “Safe Houses-Return to Shadows” was narrating 14 year old boy 
of Somali origin who was detained for one month with intensive torture late to be found innocent. See: Cliff 
Taylor, “Ugandan abuses bring regime of fear back to heart of Africa”, Independent, 12 November 1998.  




4.4.2 Kichwamba Massacre    
Abduction of civilians was another tactic used by ADF. The most haunting was the 
Kichwamba Technical College attack that left more than 80 students burnt in dormitories 
while kidnapping more than one hundred. The attack according to my interviewee who 
happened to be one of the field commanders at that time aimed at getting more reinforcement 
for their army. He also denied burning students in dormitories. He said, it was UPDF that 
burnt the dormitories only to accuse ADF as propaganda tool to tarnish its record (FWI, 
2017). However, Joab Kiganda Jr now 37yrs, one of the survivors recounts; 
 
“The first week of June 1998, we received information that ADF rebels had camped at 
the top of Mountain Rwenzori in a forest. We told a UPDF officer in charge of 
security in Uganda Technical College Kichwamba. He told us that they had enough 
security and we should not get scared, that they would repulse them if they come. On 
Sunday evening (June 7, 1998), my friend Ivan who was a cubical mate woke me up 
to go for preps. I told him that I was tired and wanted to sleep…. In an hour’s time we 
heard gun shots along Bundibujjo Road, the rebels were chanting songs, and sounded 
like they were in big number. The UPDF resisted for about 10 minutes but they were 
overpowered. The first thing the rebel did when they reached our campus was to burn 
the school lorry. I saw them myself, they shot at the transformer and at the generator 
and the power went off. I was peeping through the window as it was coming close to 
6:30am and the darkness was clearing.  
The rebels first camped between dormitories…. They were speaking English, 
Luganda, Rutooro, and Swahili asking students to come out…We could hear a lady 
commander giving orders. They told students to come out because they had come to 
liberate us but students refused.  They started shooting indiscriminately. They started 
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burning three dormitories…. A big number of students were abducted…. They 
(rebels) were standing on doors guarding the burning dormitories as others took the 
abducted students. The number of rebels was large and they were dressed in green 
army uniforms. The rebel guarding our dormitory had been put off by the soot which 
was enveloping the area. We opened and escaped through Kahaya South route to the 
school farm. We were many students fleeing and when the rebels saw us they shot at 
us and one of our friends was killed. The operation took about one hour. We could 
now only view the burning dormitory and our abducted colleagues being taken uphill 
on the opposite mountain as it was getting to 7:30am” (Basime, 2015). 
 
In August 1997, a similar incident had happened in St. John Seminary, a catholic institute that 
trained future priests. Many who dared to escape were killed, while others were abducted. 
ADF also attacked a prison in Katojo, Fort Portal in which more than 360 prisoners were 




4.4.3 Killing of Muslim Clerics 
On Friday, April 23, 2012, shortly after his Friday Question & Answer session and Isha (late 
evening) prayers, at around 9:00pm, Sheikh Abdulkarim Sentamu was shot dead by unknown 
gunmen at William Street Mosque in Kampala city (The Observer, 2012). In one of his last 
public appearances, Sentamu had earlier informed his audience about intimidations he 
received, unless he stopped “speaking about Jihad”
42
 Ugandan security pointed out on ADF 
                                                          
41
See more on abduction by an escapee Baluku who was abducted from St. John seminar: “TUWAYE: Baluku 
eyawambibwa aba ADF” on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TvB3OEmuZ_I retrieved on July 26, 2017. 
42See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aekSyYLBWEQ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aPdQc1Cajkg 
accessed on September 8, 2016. This is a full video of Ssentamu’s last public appearance, few minutes before 
his death.  
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as the primary suspects (Chimpreports, 2012). Sentamu’s murder was only a prelude to the 
death of other scholars in Uganda. After his death, many Salafi clerics that are opposed to the 
Salafi version of Mukulu have been gunned down in similar incidents (World Bulletin, 2015). 
In 2014, Dr. Abdulkadir Muwaya, leader of Shia community, was also murdered on 
Christmas Eve at his home in Mayuge district, Eastern Uganda (Kakamwa, 2014). He was 
known for supporting lots of poor families and the spreading of Shia doctrine in the county 
through his involvement in charitable programs that supports poor families in logistics and 
finance. 
 
Concisely, this section has attempted to provide the historical background of the ADF 
movement. From here, it can be deduced that pre and post-colonial social and political events 
had a lot to do with the creation of ADF. These deductions are going to be elaborated more in 
the next concluding chapter. Even though, Mukulu is in prison, ADF is still a strong force and 





5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion 
The study has attempted to document and interpret the rise of ADF, a Muslim militant 
movement operating in Uganda as well as its recent developments. The documentation has 
been aided by both interviews and archival research with particular focus on newspaper 
articles published on the movement since its inception. The thesis also has explored into 
audiotapes recorded by ADF leadership that persuaded many young Muslims to join the jihad 
agenda. Three questions guided this study: 1) what do we know about ADF? 2) How did ADF 
emerge in Uganda? 3) Is ADF jihad-Salafi movement or a local political movement in 
disguise? This concluding part, presents three broad conclusions based on the questions. 
 
1) What do we know about ADF? 
To understand ADF, it is necessary, firstly to establish the strategic environment in which the 
movement developed and in which it continues to operate. Like many other countries in 
Africa, effects of colonialism left the country and its people caught in religious and/or ethnic 
conflicts. In Uganda, as seen in chapter four, the colonial government that favoured some 
religious factions against others planted the seeds of conflict. In their own writings, colonial 
administrators became sceptical of Islam and Muslims and worked hand in hand with 
Christian chiefs to prevent their progress. Religion (Christianity) became an important 
condition for acquiring formal ‘secular’ education, jobs or any political office in the country. 




In 1971, a Muslim president Idi Amin took over power and opened up new opportunities for 
his co-religionists, which had been denied by other leaders. Having united Muslims under 
one leadership (UMSC) with headquarters, he further established Muslim schools, technical 
institutes and a university. Favouring Muslims, Amin also helped in politicking religion 
similar to his predecessors. In 1978, he was ousted and forced into exile. Once again, 
Muslims had to pay for the ‘mistakes’ in his presidency. This included the massacre and 
victimisations which continued by the successive regimes. 
 
It was in late 1980s when young Muslims who had gone for further studies in the Middle East 
returned in the country. With the ideas of ‘politicised Islam’ in mind, they began teaching in 
the mosques and streets of Kampala. Adherence to purist interpretation of Quran and Hadith 
drove their movement to direct confrontation with those who did not follow their 
understanding. Jamilu Mukulu, the leader of ADF, converted to Islam and joined this Salaf 
movement. Within a short period of time and after two years of study in Saudi Arabia (an 
equivalent to Diploma in Arabic Studies), started preaching in mosques, seminars and 
sometimes in streets. Given his rhetoric and persuasive tactics, by 1991, he could command a 
force of more than 500 Muslim youths to fight the police, killing four and their dogs and take 
over the mosque that led to their arrest until 1994. 
  
Sadly, after Mukulu’s prison term, ADF started terrorising Ugandans especially in Kampala, 
Kasese villages in Western Uganda and Eastern DRC. With the goal of establishing an 
Islamic state in Uganda, Mukulu chose the pathway of jihad-Salafism to develop his political 
ambitions. In this way, Salafism became a justifying tool for Mukulu’s political desires. 
Moreover, in retrospect of the historical Muslim socio-political grievances, Mukulu organised 
a force that was almost able to seize Kasese district. A group of more than 1500 fighters took 
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over three towns in Kasese for more than three days, leading to 55 civilian deaths in a 
sparsely populated area, and causing about 2500 people to flee their homes. Residents of the 
affected areas are still suffering from the effects of the dreadful attack
43
. Since then, the 
movement has been going into hiding and resurfacing at times.  
 
Similar to Al-Shabab in Somalia, Boko haram in Nigeria and ISIS in Iraq and Syria, ADF 
utilises harassment of government forces and murders, abductions of civilians including 
schoolchildren in the west and south-eastern parts of Uganda and in the Beni province of 
eastern DRC. These abductions are said to be used as a reinforcement option for ADF. This 
strategy gradually culminated in the 1998 Kichwamba Technical College attack, which left 80 
students dead, and more than 100 abducted. Between February 1998 and December 1999, the 
movement abducted about 200 schoolchildren.
44
  However, with a strong will power from 
government forces (UPDF), ADF was forced to relocate its activities into DRC, leading to the 
eventual arrest of its leader Jamilu Mukulu in 2015. 
 
The recent killings of Muslim clerics that begun in 2012 has been linked to the group. It is 
difficult however to ascertain the validity of this claim since ADF have neither admitted nor 
denied the allegations. However, according to ADF defectors interviewed by the author, jihad 
campaign can target anyone who speaks against the group’s ideology. Therefore, since the 
assassinated scholars were vocal against ADF and they had had received several admonitions 
warning from Mukulu, makes these allegations to have some degree of legitimacy. 
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See for example: “Mpondwe Struggles to Recover after Insurgency”. The Monitor, February 20, 2010. 
Retrieved on July 29, 2017 from http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/864904/-/wikbk0/-
/index.html 
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2)  How did ADF emerge in Uganda? 
The leader of ADF, Jamilu Mukulu is a charismatic and an eloquent speaker. Through his 
charisma, majority of Muslims even those who do not adhere to Salafism sympathised with 
him. He could also get monetary support from them as dawa contributions for the ‘dawa’ 
seminars he used to conduct across the country. Few years after his conversion to Islam, he 
had gained popularity and enough support to direct youths into military activities. 
 
Moreover, analysis of Mukulu’s sermons reveal his persuasive tactics, which were used as the 
recruiting tool. Analysis of the audio MMM revealed presence of appeals to both pathos and 
ethos. In the audios, he presented the injustices endured by Muslims after the overthrow of 
Amin. The tables below illustrate the findings. 
 
Table 4 illustrates the appeals to pathos found in the MMM audio 
No. Appeals to Pathos 
1 “your brothers in west were slaughtered like goats” 
2 “perpetrators are still living freely waiting for another chance” 
3 “Do you think that they will love you? In fact, this one example is enough to know 
them and what they conceal in their breasts” 
4 “if an opportunity rises, wait, even your ‘Aunt’ will cut your throat” 
Source: Field Data (2016) 
 
From table 4, the first example “your brothers in west were slaughtered like goats” and 
“perpetrators are still living freely waiting for another chance”, are emotional appeals that 
target attitude change. He reminds Muslims atrocities done by Christian mobs in Western 
Uganda in 1979. Using ‘goat’, he appeals to degrading emotions. In other words, he is 
persuading his audience not to wait but rather get ready to fight. In this way, he persuades the 
84 
 
audience to change their attitudes towards fighting so that they do not fall prey again, like 
what happened in 1979. 
 
Moreover, “perpetrators are still living freely waiting for another chance”, in this statement, 
there is an indication that the current regime led by President Museveni know the perpetrators 
but they do not care to take action. By doing this, he is persuading his audience to hate the 
regime and get ready to fight it. This rhetoric persuasion meets the needs of the persuader 
using concrete evidences that cannot easily be challenged. Indeed, such persuasion prepares 
the audience for sacrifice and fearlessly and change their attitude towards the desired goals of 
the speaker. 
 
Similarly, “Do you think that they will love you? In fact, this one example is enough to know 
them and what they conceal in their breast” and “if an opportunity rises, wait, even your 
‘Aunt’  will cut your throat”, which is the third and fourth example. It also conforms with 
characters that appeal to pathos. The speaker in these examples appeals to attitude change 
towards their non-Muslim relatives. In Uganda, almost in very family there are people of 
different religions (African Tradition Religions [ATR], Catholics, Muslims and Protestants). 
   
Thus in his persuasive tactics, he mentions the dangers even within family relations. 
Mentioning that someone’s aunt can surrender her sister or brother’s son or daughter, is the 
highest level of treachery a person can do within the family. This is so, because, in Uganda, 
aunties and uncles occupy positions similar to mothers or fathers
45
. Therefore, this was an 
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An example, in Buganda culture and language, a Father is called “Taata”. His children must call his brother 
also “Taata. The same with mother whom they call “Maama”, her sister should be called “Maama”. It is 
intended to strengthen family bonds. See: Onyango, O. Eria. n.d. Ugandan Traditional Cultural Values. Can also 
be accessed from https://www.academia.edu/1937342/Ugandan_Traditional_Cultural_Values, retrieved on July 
28, 2017.    
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appeal to pathos to have his audience change their attitude towards close non-Muslim 
relatives including parents. Indeed, Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2014) affirm that the main 
purpose of pathos is to “denote all kinds of emotional influence on the audience, potentially 
affecting attitude or choice” (Cockcroft and Cockcroft 2014, 87). Furthermore they also 
influence biases dictated by emotions and can change even the audience’s on a previously 
biased topic (ibid, 88). 
 
Table 5 illustrates appeals to ethos found in MMM 
No. Appeals to ethos in MMW 
1 “and they will not cease from fighting you until they have made you renegades 
from you religion, if they can” 
2 “O you who believe, when you encounter unbelievers in the battle, never turn 
your backs to them” 
3 “And if those who disbelieve fight against you, they will certainly turn their 
backs, then they will not find neither a protector nor a helper”   
Source: Filed Data (2016) 
 
In order for the audience to conceive speaker’s credibility, the speaker recites a verse in 
Quran (2:217), which is in example one: “and they will not cease from fighting you until they 
have made you renegades from you religion, if they can”. With this example, the speaker 
align himself first to his audience, and presents himself to be part of those who are being 
fought by the ‘non-believers’. This indeed, coincides with what Hyde (2004, 13) observes 
that for successful appeal to ethos, the speaker “must appear to share personal similarity with 
the audience” (Hyde 2004, 13). Moreover, examples two and three; “O you who believe, 
when you encounter unbelievers in the battle, never turn your backs to them” and “And if 
those who disbelieve fight against you, they will certainly turn their backs, then they will not 
find neither a protector nor a helper,” appeals to ethos. Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2014) 
observe that, the religious appeal to of ethos, that bear “emotive power exercised by the 
sacred texts of all major religious traditions should be recognised as a form of ethos” 
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(Cockcroft and Cockcroft 2014, 88). Indeed, the speaker supports his words with religious 
text of the Quran to align himself with his audience. 
 
Many Muslims in Uganda perceived ADF as a retaliation to marginalisation and injustices 
that were done to Muslims since the colonial period. The above analysis proves the role of 
Muslim discontent with the ‘Christian’ regimes. Muslims are the less advantaged in the 
country with poor education, economically struggling, no access to ‘white-collar’ jobs among 
others. For this reason, such persuasive rhetoric directly appeals to their realities. This helped 
him to influence youths into violence. 
 
3)  Is ADF a Jihad-Salafi Movement or a local Political movement in disguise? 
Looking at the results as seen from archival research, interviews and audio recording of 
Mukulu’s sermons, the indication that the movement is motivated by Jihad-Salafi ideology is 
evident. Since its inception, ADF focused on anti-Sufi approach and advocated for literal 
understanding of Islam. The group used the Salafi ideology and practice and its recruiting 
strategy mainly targeted Salafi audience. However, due to its belief in physical jihad, the 
mainstream salafis in Uganda refer to them as khawarij derogatively, and present them as 
those who deviated from the correct path. This dynamic is similar to what observed by 
Thurston (2015) in the divide between mainstream salafis and Boko Haram in Nigeria.  
 
Additionally, ADF is similar to other Jihad-Salafi idealised groups such as Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS), Al-Shaba, ISIS and al-Qaeda among others. They call for violence and armed 
rebellion against Christian-led governments but also to their fellow Muslims. Also looking at 
their history, they started life as political and active-challengers of UMSC leadership. They 
first approved only acts of civil disobedience to bring about change in the administration of 
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Muslim affairs in the country. However, when the government jailed them in 1991 for protest, 
they turned into armed resistance. This is similar to Islamic Salvation Front (abbreviated as 
FIS due to its official French name, Front Islamique du Salut) in Algeria. FIS started by 
contesting elections with general protests and civil disobedience. This changed in 1993 to 
armed resistance when the military officials annulled their electoral success (Maher 2016, 
10).  
 
Similarly, the Egyptian Takfir wal Hijra group, also initially begun as quietist-rejectionists. 
Their members withdrew from society and moved to wholly isolated communes in the 
mountains (ibid, 11). However, when the government moved against them, they changed into 
perhaps jihadist/violent-rejectionists leading to taking a former government minister hostage 
and eventually killed him. This is also the same with Boko-Haram under Yusuf Muhamad. It 
started activities peacefully before the 2009 government clampdown, in which estimated 800 
of its members were killed. After that attacker, also their leader by then Mohammed Yusuf 
was later killed while still in Nigerian police custody. It was from there that the group 




5.2 Final thoughts and Recommendation 
This study has attempted to analyse the emergence and development of ADF in Uganda. The 
study has presented various attempts by Muslims in Uganda to regain political force right 
from the pre-colonial times to post-colonial era. It is clear that the attempt has been fuelled by 
the desire to rejuvenate Muslim identity in social, economic and political arenas from 
marshes where colonial and neo-colonial political situations had dumped them for decades. It 
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 See more on Boko Haram: Brigaglia, Andrea. 2012. Ja’far Mahmoud Adam, Mohamed Yusuf and al-Muntada 
Islamic Trust: Reflection on the Genesis of the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria. Annual Review of Islam in 
Africa, Issue No. 11.  
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is the same idea that ADF have in mind but with an added ingredient of ‘pure’ Islam as 
practiced by al-salaf salih. 
Unfortunately, Ugandan government has not done enough to address these grievances. The 
government either is keeping a blind eye or still failed to find a sustainable solution to these 
Muslim demands that continue to enrage them. One of the main Muslim leaders of Uganda, 
Mufti Zubair Kayongo (d. 2015), once argued that all Muslims should shun government 
functions as an act of protest over what he called “marginalisation.”(Otege, 2011) His anger 
stemmed from the fact that the ministerial positions offered to Muslims were considered “too 
few” (ibid). Kayongo and his committee of Muslim clerics resolved: “We are aggrieved and 
extremely dissatisfied with the way President Museveni distributed ministerial posts as we 
hardly got any influential positions beside one Cabinet minister and four state ministers 
despite enlarged cabinet.” (ibid). Such discontentment keeps on building in the hearts of 
many Muslims and can easily descend into violence. 
  
Further, it is not a surprise that when the government reported its decision to close down 
some informal Islamic schools (madrasas) and mosques that were identified to be recruiting 
cells for ADF, many Muslims clerics opposed the action as a systematic tactic to stop the 
teaching of Islamic religion in Uganda.
47
 Much has been done, especially by the government, 
to eradicate the ADF and its activities in the country. For that reason, it is until when Muslim 
grievances receive decisive attention (especially some degree of social justice), that Islamism 
will be checked. 
 
                                                          
47See: UGO Uganda. 2013. “Muslims criticize Police crackdown on Madarasa schools”, UGO Uganda, August 9. 
Accessed on August 7, 2017 from http://news.ugo.co.ug/muslims-criticizepolice-crackdown-on-madarasa-
schools/   
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Furthermore, Ugandan government has been accused of continuous violation of human rights 
especially with Muslim youths suspected to be members of ADF. In fact, the president came 
out openly and advised his security agencies to desist from torturing suspects, which he said 
is unnecessary and wrong. He confirmed that torture to extract evidence might unfairly target 
a wrong person later to find out that the person was innocent.
48
 His comment came in after 13 
ADF suspects of which all were Muslims appeared in courts with horrific injuries including 
gaping wounds on their knees and ankles, which they said were as a result of police 
beatings.
49
 They were all walking in difficulty as they limped to court, half-naked as they 
expose wounds on the arms and chest, which impelled the few present family members to 
break into tears. Such inhuman actions may do little to solve the problem. In some instances, 
wrong suspects may be forced to plead guilty just to avoid the continuous torture leaving the 
perpetrators free. It can also force others to join such movements. Moreover, in others 
instances it may be used as evidence by the recruiters to convince more youths into acts of 
violence hence escalating the dilemma. 
 
Additionally, the government should work hand in hand with Muslim theologians who are 
versed with the Islamic knowledge to mitigate ADF ideology. It should be noted that ADF 
ideology together with other Islamist movements as observed by al-Yaqoub (2015) is based 
on a system of misconceptions that split the Islamic sacred texts from their context. This 
ideology further uses tricks that make selective use of whatever elements of the Sharia that 
satisfy their “twisted minds” (al-Yaqoubi 2015, 1). In order to counter such ideology, well-
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 Read full letter directed to all security agencies in Uganda on: 
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AGAINST-TORTURE#from_embed, accessed on august 30, 2017.  
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versed scholars in Islamic sciences need to have decisive response. At this moment in 
Uganda, even if ADF disappears (given now their leader is in prison), while its ideology still 
prevails, it will give birth to new and sometimes even more radical groups. Government 
should provide logistics inform of research funds, facilitation of workshops in the country 
that aim at addressing Muslim youths against extremism as well as promoting scholars that 
teach moderate interpretation of Islam.  
 
Additionally, Muslim scholars need to devise all possible mechanism that can help to educate 
youths extensively the teachings of Islam. It is clear from the interviews that no single 
member of ADF had ever studied Islamic sciences to a substantial level that affirms his/her 
credibility in Islamic scholarship. Jamilu Mukulu for example, the ADF leader and spiritual 
advisor, after converting to Islam, he studied for only two years in Riyadh in an intermediary 
stage that teaches non-Arab students Arabic. After that completing that level, he went back to 
Uganda and started preaching and gained popularity. That is why many of his colleagues who 
stayed and completed the University lever (in Medina or Riyadh) never joined him after their 
return. 
 
Moreover, other spiritual leaders of the group, I interviewed also confessed, that they did not 
even complete thanawi level (equivalent to high school in normal secular studies). They 
quitted school to join the movement after being persuaded by Jamilu’s rhetoric sermons at 
Nakasero mosque. In fact, other Salafis including Jamilu’s teachers who rejected violence 
were far ahead of him in terms of Islamic religious education. They had completed studies 
from Islamic university in Medina. In fact, no single graduate from Medina or from any 
Middle-Eastern university has ever joined ADF since its inception in 1996. Recruits were 
mostly youths who had studied some bit of secular studies and a little bit of Islamic sciences 
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from local sheikhs. Those are the ones, who were later persuaded by Jamilu’s rhetoric Jihad 
sermons to join his jihad group. For that reason, Ugandan scholars need to unanimously and 
unabashedly, refute ADF actions by providing evidences that repudiate the group’s claims. 
Literatures and lectures should be prepared that engages deeply into ADF ideology and 
replace it with moderate Islam that accepts co-existence and tolerance. The government, 
through its counterterrorism units can support the initiative. In the process, the ideology will 
be defeated which will eventually lead to peace particularly in Uganda.     
 
On the other hand, Muslims especially the Jihad-Salafi youths in Uganda and elsewhere need 
to use their senses and reconsider their da’wa strategies. The utopia of an Islamic state or 
having a world that have uniform way of thinking need to be checked. The Quran its self 
clearly states the fact that the whole world will not be Muslims. “And if it was the will of your 
Lord”, the Quran confirms to Muhammad, “All who are on earth would have believed. Will 
you then compel them to believe against their will” (Q 10:99).  
 
Another verse not only refer to lack of faith but variety of faith, explaining that his diversity 
is exactly what God desired for humanity: “And We have sent down the Book [Qu’an] to you 
with truth, confirming and conserving the previous Books….We have appointed a law and 
practice for every one of you. Had God willed, He would have made you single community, 
but He wanted to test you regarding what has come to you. So compete with each other in 
doing good actions. Everyone will return to God and He will inform you regarding the things 
about which you differed” (Q5:48). Indeed this striking verse confirms clearly that Islam is a 




Lastly, if sacred texts (Quran and Hadiths) is not enough for Islamists to learn that Islam is 
not religion of terror but rather a religion of mercy, love and compassionate, let them learn 
from history. Historically, most of the time violent activities have produced more harm to 
Muslims than good. In Uganda for example, Muslims had existed with Museveni’s regime in 
peace and harmony with less government interventions. Muslims in Uganda freely preached 
their understanding of Islam without any interferences from the government. Jamilu Mukulu 
himself and his team travelled in almost all parts of the country teaching his version of Islam 
before turning into violence.  
 
However, when he declared the intention of rebellion, the government responded as expected. 
Arrests, torture, extra-judicial killings started targeting mainly Muslim youths suspected to be 
part of Jamilu’s jihad scheme. This resulted to government censorship of Muslim sermons 
and closing of some Muslim informal schools (madrasas) and mosques. If Jamilu had 
intended to promote Islam in Uganda through violence, unfortunately, he mistakenly led to its 
collapse because madrasas (promoters of Islamic sciences and Muslims) could no longer 
operate. 
  
This is the same mistake followed by ISIS, Boko haram, and al-Qaeda and other Islamist 
movements. They failed to understand, and still consider violence as the only mean for the 
contemporary daunting affairs of Muslims and Islam. Rather as concluded by al-Yaqoubi, 
they have turned to be the “most dangerous enemy Islam has ever seen” (al-Yaqoubi, 2015, 
1). Indeed, a lot can be said which is beyond the scope of this study. However, simple 
glimpse on the statics in terms of Muslim losses after 9/11 attacks in United States is enough 
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to understand the outcomes of perpetrating violence. As a result, the he attacks left about 




The reason for this catastrophic mayhem was the need to free the umma (Muslim world) from 
western invasion and imperialism. In reiteration however, the US and its allies bombed 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya among others. According to Brown University’s Watson 
Institute for International and Public Affairs report released in 2015 estimated 149,000 deaths 
in Afghanistan.
51
 Also about 10.1 million Afghan and Iraqi people are still living as refugees 
and internally displaced persons in grossly inadequate conditions. That is only Afghanistan, 
for Iraq, the figure exceed 400,000 since 2003
52
. These are mostly innocent Muslim children 
and women. What has Islam and Muslims gained in all these violent activities? In my thought 
and opinion, perpetrating violence causes even more violence. The best solution is to chant 
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